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The standard story about Islam and America is that September 11,
2001 marked a watershed in relations between the United States and its
Muslim citizens; indeed, for Muslims all over the Western world.I Whether
it has, as Professor Mary Dudziak has posed, "changed everything" 2
depends on what "everything" means. Certainly, since 2001, American
Muslims have experienced continuing distrust in some of their communities
and among some non-Muslim citizens, 3 as well as waves of support from
non-Muslims who understand their plight. Historians tell us that narratives
are important for how we understand the world:

.

[Historians] want to believe (although we also often deny
or repress this) that the past was ordered in some
discernible way that we can discover and describe. . .
[However,] coherence is not out there, in the past, buried
with the artifacts of other times and capable of being dug
up; instead, we impose our desire for coherence, our refusal
and inability to live without it, on the past as we construct
in our studies, and we accomplish this transformation
through the power and instruments of narrative.'
Reviewing the historical work on Muslims in America, there appear to
be at least two "storylines" on them and non-Muslim Americans'
perceptions of them; both stretch back to before the American founding.
One storyline about Islam in America focuses on the contribution of
Muslims, like other immigrant groups, to creating the contemporary
American melting pot. This storyline recognizes the exploits of Muslim
explorers and pioneers like Esevanico Dorantes, who came to America in
1527, and Anthony Jansen van Salee, who settled in New Netherlands.'

Christine Ludowise, Review of September 11 in History: A Watershed Moment? by Mary L.
2004),
(Feb.
REv.
POL.
BOOK
LAW
&
14
(Editor),
Dudziak
http://www.lawcourts.org/LPBR/reviews/Dudziak204.htm.
2 Id.; see also Abstract, Mary L. Dudziak, September ]] In History:A WatershedMoment? (2003),
https://works.bepress.com/marydudziak/7/ (last visited July 27, 2018).
3 See, e.g., Mucalit Balici, Being Targeted, Being Recognized; The Impact of 9/11 on Arab and
Muslim Americans, 40 CONTEMP. Soc. 133 (2011) (discussing targeting of Arabs and Muslims
as a "suspect population" after 9/11). This suspicion predated the events of September 11,
however. See, e.g., Patrice Brodeur, The Changing Nature of Islamic Studies and American
Religious History (Part1), 91 MUSLIM WORLD 71 (2001).
4 Brodeur, supra note 3, at 71 (quoting Robert A. Orsi, "Sex, Pain and Death, and the American
Protestant Establishment, Some Comments on William R. Hutchison, ed., Between the Times: The
ProtestantEstablishment in America, 1900-1960" 1).
See Race Capet, CreatedEqual: Slavery and America's Muslim Heritage, 60 CROSSCURRENTS
549, 549-551 (2010); KAMBiZ GHANEABASSIRi, A HISTORY OF ISLAM IN AMERICA: FROM THE

NEW WORLD TO THE NEW WORLD ORDER 10-12 (1st ed. 2010); Marie A. Failinger, Islam in the
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Similarly, it acknowledges the influence of educated and influential African
Muslim imported slaves like Job Ben Solomon, whose celebrated life as an
educated Maryland slave led to celebrity in London and freedom in
Gambia. 6 In this storyline, we hear the resonance of the immigration of
other Americans, from Puritans and Germans to Vietnamese and, in the case
of Syrian Muslims immigrating from modem-day Lebanon, escaping
economic and political oppression in the Ottoman Empire.' We can follow
early twentieth-century Muslims, like Europeans before them, as they move
to populate the Midwest in places like Detroit, Michigan; Cedar Rapids,
Iowa; and Ross, North Dakota.'
In this first storyline, we hear of the influence that Islam had on nonMuslim Americans, like Thomas Jefferson, and perhaps other Framers who
were paying attention to the work of Muslim jurists and governors as they
considered the framework for the U.S. Constitution.' We learn that other
American intellectuals-Ralph Waldo Emerson among them-were
similarly influenced by Islamic sources.'o And we acknowledge that, just as
African slaves and other Muslims were being converted to Christianity," so

Mind of American Courts: 1800 to 1960, 32 B.C. J. L. & Soc. JUST. 1, 4-6 (2012). Capet notes
that some of these Muslims were Moriscos, Muslims apparently converted to Christianity;
however, it is often not clear whether they were actual converts or only appeared to convert. Capet
cites the example of Giorgio Zapata, who became rich from Peru's silver mines, but returned to
Istanbul, and his former name and religion. Capet, supra note 5, at 550.
6 See Capet, supra note 5, at 556 (also describing four slaves who successfully presented a petition
to the South Carolina House of Representatives to free them, since they had been made prisoners
of war, who were supposed to be freed by an English captain).
7 Failinger, supra note 5, at 8.
8 Richard Freeland, The Treatment of Muslims in American Courts, 12 ISLAM & CHRISTIANMUSLIM RELATIONS 449, 451 (noting that the first building built specifically as a mosque was
built in Cedar Rapids in the 1920s); Failinger, supra note 5, at 8.
9 See generally Kevin J. Hayes, How Thomas Jefferson Read the Qur'an, 39 EARLY AM.
LITERATURE 247 (2004); Azizah Y. al-Hibri, Islamic and American Constitutional Law:
Borrowing Possibilitiesor a History of Borrowing?, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 493, 494-95 (1999);
see also Peter Manseau, Why Thomas Jefferson Owned a Quran, SMITHSONIAN (Jan. 31, 2018),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/why-thomas-jefferson-owned-qur- 1180967997/.
10 Suzan Jameel Fakahani, Islamic Influences on Emerson's Thought: The Fascinationof a
Nineteenth Century America Writer, 18 J. MUSLIM MINORITY AFF. 291, 291, 298 (1998) (noting
that a number of American writers, including Emerson, made a "pilgrimage" to Palestine and
Egypt, and Emerson in particular was much influenced by Islam and Muslim culture and values,
"[particularly] Islamic social values such as hospitality, personal nobility, and regard for
women.").
11 The Smithsonian Institution has captured the stories of slaves such as Omar ibn Said, captured
in Senegal, sold in Charleston in 1807, arrested after an attempt to escape, and touted as a Christian
convert who "wore no bonds but those of slavery" through articles in Boston and Philadelphia
newspapers. The story notes that his Arabic writings on the walls of his prison make it clear that
his "conversion" was purely for practical reasons. Before all the things he valued in life had been
taken from him, Said said he had prayed as a Muslim, but now he would say the Lord's Prayer,
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too were white and black Americans-like Methodist missionary Reverend
Norman and Manila consul Alexander Russell Webb-being converted to
Islam. 12
The other storyline, which also stretches back to before the founding,
is the story of Muslims as outsiders and always alien, as exotic or menacing,
and as social and political, even theological threats to "the real America."13
Due to the influence of late 17th and early 18th century European
distortions of Islam, Muslims were branded by many Americans as
"infidels" whose "combined use of false religion and military could subdue"
America.14 Prominent anti-slavery Americans like Benjamin Franklin used
distortions of North African Islam to make their point." Like the modernday Somali pirates that have frightened and angered the Western world,16
Americans during the founding were steeped in tales told since the 12th and
13th century crusades about Barbary pirates who would enslave
Christians. i7 These lurid stories were taken up by prominent theologians
like the American preacher Cotton Mather to illustrate the "oppressing" of
the "Mahometan Tempters," the "fierce monsters of Africa."" Historian
Patrice Brodeur notes, quoting history professor Robert J. Allison:
Americans at the time saw these episodes as part of a
contest between Christians and Muslims, between
Europeans and Turks or Moors, and ultimately, between
what came to be called civilization and what the newly
civilized world would define as barbarism. Americans
inherited this understanding of the Muslim world and
pursued this enemy more relentlessly than the Europeans

he revealed in his writings. But he also peppered his text with prophetic declarations of divine
wrath directed at the country that deprived him of his freedom. "'0people of America, 0 people
of North Carolina,' he wrote. 'Do you have a good generation that fears Allah? Are you confident
that He who is in heaven will not cause the earth to cave in beneath you, so that it will shake to
pieces and overwhelm you?"'; see Manseau, supranote 9.
12 Freeland, supra note 8, at 451 (noting that the revival of interest in Islam by the African
American community can be traced back to lectures by Edward Wilmot Blyden in the 1870s and
1880s, and the Black Muslim movement can be traced back to 1913 with the establishment of the
Newark-based Moorish-American Science Temple by Noble Drew Ali).
13 See, e.g., al-Hibri,supra note 9, at 493 (noting that immigrant Muslims are seen as "alien to our
system of democracy and human rights, and hence somewhat suspect.").
14 Id. at 494.
15 Thomas S. Kidd, "Is it Worse to Follow Mahomet than the Devil?" Early American Uses of
Islam, 72 AM. Soc'Y CHURCH HIST. 766, 766, 786 (2003).
6 See, e.g., Jeffrey Gettleman, Lessons from the Barbary Pirate Wars, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19,
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/12/weekinreview/12gettleman.html.
17 Brodeur, supra note 3, at 75-76.
1s Mukhtar Ali Islani, Cotton Mather and the Orient, 43 NEw ENG. Q. 46, 51-52 (1970).
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had done.19
In this alternative story, Muslims were portrayed as imposters who had
created a religious "[m]edley made up of Judaism, the several Heresies of
the Christians then in the East, and the Old Pagan Rites of the Arabs, with
an indulgence to all Sensual Delights." 20 American colonists often
associated Muslims, as with Catholics, with the Anti-Christ .21 Well-known
religious leaders, such as Roger Williams, as well as prominent political
leaders like Jonathan Edwards' son-in-law, Aaron Burr, contributed to this
storyline.2 2
Vices widely attributed to Muslims at the turn of the 18th century were
cunning and fraud, carnality, wickedness, and the indiscriminate use of
violence to gain power over non-Muslims. 23 Perhaps most important in the
treatment of Muslims in early American law, medieval and later scholars
portrayed Islamic culture as "static-shaped, organized and regulated by
unchanging religious prescription . . . oppressive and sensual at the same
time, both covering up women and exposing them to the exploitation of men
and the slavery of the harem." 24
The state-reinforced racialization of Muslims in the early 20th century
arose from and further embellished and hardened the storyline that Muslims
were foreigners, like Asian aliens who could never be domesticated.2 5
Muslims were excluded from the United States through several
Congressional acts from 1882-1917 that barred Asians from entering the
country. 26 They were also discouraged by bans of "polygamists[] or persons
who admit their belief in the practice of polygamy" in 1891; literacy
requirements for immigrants imposed in 1917; and country immigration
quotas that favored immigrants from northern and western Europe.27

19 ROBERT J. ALLISON, THE CRESCENT OBSCURED: THE UNITED STATES AND THE MUSLIM

WORLD, 1776-1815, xv (1995); Brodeur, supra note 3, at 76.
20 Kidd, supra note 15, at 774 (quoting HUMPHREY PRIDEAUX, THE TRUE NATURE
OF IMPOSTURE
DISPLAYED IN THE LIFE OF MAHOMET 13 (3d ed. 1698)).

21 PRIDEAUX, supra note 20, at 7; Kidd, supra note 15, at
774.
22 Kidd, supra note 15, at 779-80.
23
Id at 771-75.
24 See Christina Michelmore, Old Pictures in New Frames: Images oflslam and Muslims
in Post
World War II American PoliticalCartoons, 23 J. AM. & COMP. CULTURES 37, 43 (2000).
25 Failinger, supra note 5, at 14. For a discussion of the treatment of other immigrant groups
as
"other," see Marie A. Failinger, Recovering the Face-to-Face in American ImmigrationLaw, 16
S. CAL. REv. L. & SOC. JUST. 319, 329-34 (1999).
26 Failinger, supra note 5, at 9.
27 The Asiatic Barred Zone, promulgated in 1917, excluded admissions of anyone on the content
of Asia except from those islands already in U.S. possession; and the Immigration Act of 1924
reduced immigration quotas from most other Muslim-dominated nations to about 100 persons per
year. Id. at 9 (citing GHANEABASSIRI, supra note 5, at 151). While the 1952 McCarran-Walter
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This second storyline about Muslims was reinforced in the popular
mind in the 20th century, as evidenced in Christina Michelmore's study of
American political cartoons after World War 11.28 Beginning with the
founding of Israel in 1948, these cartoons portrayed Arabs (equated with
Muslims) as bullies, as "robed shayks, befezed gentlemen, scantily clad
dancing girls, and . .. overly clad harem girls." 2 9 Once again, after the 1970s
oil crises, these "malevolent, alien, rodent-like Arabs" were portrayed in the
popular press as "leering, capricious, [and] irresponsible" persons who
wielded power over America's presumed right to access to oil; these
cartoons suggested that their "greed illegitimately threaten[ed] the
American way of life."3 0 Then, after the Iranian revolution in 1979, the
Ayatollah Khomeini "cast a long shadow ... ;" his images in cartoons were
consistently "unrelievedly evil and universally harrowing."3" In these
images and words, he was portrayed as "a fanatical, threatening figure-an
evil Aladdin who calls forth the genie of violence and anarchy .

.

. the

intolerant and intolerable agent of the devil, the grim reaper, a satanic force
at work in the world." 32
If we are to uncover lingering implicit biases against Muslims that may
inhibit their attempts to find equal justice in American state courts, as well
as in political and social life generally, it is instructive to consider how these
courts responded to this popular view of Muslims as evil and threatening
outsiders, full of trickery and potentially violent. On one hand, American
judges are products of their own communities; they read the same papers,
watch the same TV or Twitter feeds, and have the same discussions about
politics with friends and family that other Americans do. On the other hand,
judges are an unusually well-educated group of Americans: in 2018,
American lawyers represented less than 0.4% of the American populace,"
and the trial and appellate judges who manage and decide these cases are a
small and especially well-seasoned fraction of that number. Given that
American judges are expected to be impartial and look for irrelevancies and
illegitimate bias, one might expect-or at least hope-that their treatment
Act lifted racial quotas, it retained significantly small country quotas for these nations. Id. at 9
(citing Freeland, supra note 8, at 452).
28 Michelmore, supranote 24, at 39-40.
29
Id. at 38-40.
30

Id at 41.
31 Id at 41-42.
32
Id at 42.
33 There were an estimated 326.9 million people living in the U.S. in 2018, U.S. Population,
WORLDOMETERS, http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/us-population/ (last visited
July 27, 2018) and there were an estimated 1.34 million lawyers. Number ofLawyers in the US.
from 2007 to 2018, STATISTA https://www.statista.com/statistics/740222/number-of-lawyers-us/
(last visited July 27, 2018).
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of Muslims would emphasize religious commitments only where they are
extremely relevant to the case at hand, not reflecting either explicit or
implicit bias against these faiths; and expect prosecutors, lawyers, and juries
to do the same. One would also hope that American judges' opinions would
reflect respect for the differences between Islam and the Christian Western
tradition that are worthy of respect, and, where there is an unavoidable
conflict between American values and Islamic law, articulate fully and
convincingly why American mores and law must prevail.
In an earlier study, I looked at how American courts portrayed Islam
and Muslims in cases from 1800 to 1960.34 This project continues that
review in American state courts from 1960 until September 11, 2001.3 The
purpose of this project is not to construct some overarching theoretical
framework to explain American social and legal views of Islam and
Muslims, though I will necessarily interpret what the cases say to some
extent. Given the lengthy time period involved, the number of cases in
which Muslims or Islam are referenced, and the fact that these cases come
from many states,36 it seemed prudent to defer to others who have
34 See Failingersupra note 5.
35 I have limited this review to state court cases because of the sheer volume of cases in which

.

Muslims or Islam were mentioned in Westlaw searches. Moreover, because cases involving
prisoner complaints predominate in both federal and state courts during this period, and because
American courts tend to be naturally suspicious of prisoner complaints-which might skew
consideration of cases in which non-incarcerated Muslims appear-I have eliminated these cases
from review as well. Federal court cases are well worthy of study if only to consider whether the
selection criteria for, and lifetime appointments of, federal judges have made any difference in the
ways that they perceive their role when Muslim litigants are involved.
36 Nor can I promise that this review has captured every such case; my Westlaw search was limited
to the 575 or so cases that were flagged with the terms "Islam," "Muslim," "Moslem," "Qur'an,"
or "Koran" because these are, in my experience, the most common cases in which Islam is actually
discussed. In some cases, these terms came up because, for example, a litigant or witness was
named "Islam," or "Muhammad." These are excluded from my discussion, as were most of the
cases in which courts referred to Islam as part of a string of other religions, such as in challenges
to holiday displays. See, e.g., Conrad v. City of Denver, 724 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Colo. 1986) (in
which a witness testified that the county Christmas Nativity scene was idolatry contrary to the
Koran); see also Perumal v. Saddleback Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 243 Cal. Rptr. 545, 564 (Ct.
App. 1988) (Crosby, J., dissenting), overruled by Van Schoick v. Saddleback Valley Unified Sch.
Dist, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562 (Ct. App. 2001) (in a student free speech case, mentioning the Koran
as part of a series of holy books that might be distributed at school); State v. T.B.D., 656 So. 2d
479, 482 (Fla. 1995) (cross-burning statute applied to juvenile "plays no favorites-it protects
equally the Baptist, Catholic, Jew, Muslim, the Communist, Bircher, Democrat, Nazi, Republican,
Socialist; the African-American, Caucasian, Haitian, Hispanic,[N]ative American, Vietnamese.
."); Foster v. State, 748 S.W.2d 903, 908 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (death penalty case in which the
prosecutor argued in closing, "[t]he Christians have the Golden Rule 'Do unto others what you
would have them do unto you.' Muslims reversed this process, and the Koran says, 'Do not do
unto others what you would have him do unto you [sic]. . . .'); State v. Cribbs, 967 S.W.2d 773,
783 (Tenn. 1998) (challenge to prosecutor's mentioning holy books, including the Bible and the
"Koran" in support of the death penalty); Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 361 n.34 (Tex. App.
2001), overruled by 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (where the "Koran" is cited for the proposition that the
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constructed critiques of the way American law as a whole has treated
Muslims. Nor will I attempt to put these cases in the historical contexts in
which they arose, including the actions and views of the political branches
when these cases were decided. But I hope that a survey of these cases will
be instructive as to the ways in which implicit biases can affect the quality
of justice and illuminate the ways in which courts both reflected and
overcame these biases.37
I. ISLAM IN THE MIND OF AMERICAN COURTS: THEN AND
NOW
In my previous survey of American references to Islam and Muslims,
covering many of the 19th and early 20th century cases, I noted that
American judges essentially followed the two storylines about Muslims
described above, though certainly not with the exacerbated rhetoric used by
cartoonists or influence-makers I have briefly recited.38 In one storyline,
Muslims are just as sincere and worthy of respect as Americans of other
traditions, and Islamic law is a valuable research tool for determining how
judges should interpret cases at least in some areas, such as usury.3 9
Following the first storyline, courts sometimes commented favorably on the
adherence of Muslims to Qur'anic principles.4 0 They also declared, often,
the equality of religions that the Bill of Rights protected.4 1
In the other storyline, judges accepted the stereotype that Islam is a
primitive and autocratic religion that subjugates women, among other
things.4 2 In some references from 1800 to 1960, judges seem, to some
extent, to accept the trope of the conquering "hordes" wielding "the Koran
in one hand and a scimitar in the other."4 3 For example, some courts quoted
President Adams' view that the law of nations for Muslims conceived of
"the state of nature as a state of war."" They also portrayed the Qur'an

three major religions-Christianity, Judaism, and Islam-disapprove of homosexual intimate
behavior).
37 For a discussion of the effect of implicit racial bias in the criminal system, see generally Robert
Smith & Justin Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion,25 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 795 (2012).
38 See generally Failinger,supra note 5.
39
Id. at 19-21.
40
Id at 19.
41 Id at 24-27.
42
Id at 22.
43
Sw. Wash. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Fender, 150 P.2d 983, 994 (Wash. 1944); Failinger, supra note
5, at 14.
4 Failinger, supra note 5, at 18 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 58 n.8 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)).
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(usually spelled Koran) as impractical and Islamic law as far removed from
the law of Christian nations.4 5
As we move into the modem period, the references to Muslim and
Islam tend to be less gratuitous and stereotypical, and it is rarer to find
judges reaching for Muslims or Islam as an analogy to an unrelated case.
The direct references describing Islam as a primitive, autocratic, or violent
religion become harder to find. When the references arise, they are often
particular to the specific legal subject at the heart of the case, which is how
this article will be organized-into criminal law, family law, and other civil
cases.
It is, however, interesting to see how often the courts mention that one
of the parties or witnesses in the case is Muslim without any seeming
relevance to the actual legal problem at issue. It is also unclear in many
cases whether the courts mention these individuals' religious tradition
simply because it fills in the legal narrative more fully, or because it serves
to explain something about the character of the Muslim litigant or witness,
for good or ill, or simply because the court finds it an interesting, perhaps
exotic, fact about the participants.
It also appears that, for the most part, American judges seem
insensitive to the fact that identification of one of the parties as Muslim may
become a decisive factor in decision-making, given the social context in this
period, especially in close cases. While the judges are willing to call out
prosecutors and other attorneys who are clearly playing the religion card, in
other cases where these identifications seem isolated or merely ignorant,
some of these judges tended to shrug and declare the equivalent of harmless
error.
In general, the criminal law cases present the most consistent examples
of explicit or implicit bias against Muslims, often as prosecutors attempt to
influence juries. 46 However, these biases are sometimes found in comments
by not only the prosecutors but also the judges and defense counsel. 47 Black
Muslims figure most prominently in these biased comments, and in the most
notorious cases.4 8 Sometimes, however, criminal courts are required to
consider whether practices specific to Muslims-or claimed to be required
by Islamic law-including dress, food, prayer and even the relationship of
men and women-require any different treatment.49 In most cases, courts
decline to accommodate Muslims in these cases even when there are

45 Id. at 15-19.
46 See infra Part II.
47 See infra notes 138-40, 159.
48 See infra Section A.
49 See infra Part II.
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implicit suggestions of links between Black Muslims and terrorism.o One
issue worth further consideration is to ask why some of these courts even
inject the litigants' religion into the case when it appears to have no direct
relevance to either the legal issue or the relevant facts.
By contrast, in the family law cases during this period, there appear to
be fewer clearly derogatory comments by judges or lawyers and more
comments underscoring the importance of treating Muslim adherents like
any other Americans." However, the courts still struggle with questions
about the reception of Islamic law or the law of majority-Muslim countries
and whether practices that litigants claim are required by Islamic law should
be deferred to or rejected on public policy grounds, particularly as they
touch on gender issues.
The other civil law cases are smaller in number, but substantively
cover a large number of areas. Most prominent, though few, are the
employment discrimination cases, where courts not only have to make
traditional factual determinations about whether employers or fellow
employees have harassed or otherwise discriminated against Muslims on
religious grounds-they also must decide whether non-discrimination
statutes require accommodations for Muslims on prayer, dress, and food.52
In the smattering of other cases, however, we do occasionally see
resonances of the issues that are prominent in the criminal cases, from the
treatment of Black Muslims to the gratuitous references to Muslims' faith
as their cases are adjudicated.53
II. CRIMINAL CASES
In the criminal cases from 1960 to September 11, 2001, some recurring
themes emerge despite the small sample size. First, the most prominent and
consistent negative references to Muslims involve members of the Nation
of Islam (often called Black Muslims), both in notorious cases and in themes
that black Muslims are subversive, violent, inherently criminal and
dishonest. Many of these cases involve prosecutorial misconduct,
procedural errors, or claims of incompetent representation involving jury
selection, questioning witnesses, and closing arguments. One particular
difficulty-which the courts mostly punt on-is determining how Muslim
practices in dress, in witness swearing, in prayer, or other religious
obligations may bias the jury or other decision-makers in the cases. Another

'o See infra Part II.
5 See infra Part III.
52 See infra Part IV.
5 Compare infra Part IV with infra Part II.
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is the question of the courts' obligations when defendants are the ones who
raise Islam or their Muslim faith in court, whether they are attempting to
distance themselves from Islam or suggesting that their faith is a sign of
good character, given social prejudices that may accompany references to
Islam. Furthermore, one question that the cases consistently raise is why
judges even mention the religious faith of Muslim litigants when it is not
seemingly relevant to the law or facts of the case.
A. BLACK MUSLIMS: SUBVERSIVE, VIOLENT, UNTRUSTWORTHY

As noted, "the Black Muslim" figures prominently in American state
criminal cases in the period from 1960 to 2001. Two sensational state
criminal cases involving Black Muslims cast long shadows on the criminal
justice system.54 These and other cases suggest that "Black Muslims" are
subversive, violent, and untrustworthy.
The Nation of Islam, headed from 1934 to 1975 by Elijah Muhammad
and made famous by the work of Malcolm X until their rift in 1963,51 is
only one of several Islamic American sects which appealed to black
Americans starting in the early 20th century. Among the earliest prominent
sects were the Moorish Science Temple of America (founded by Timothy
Drew, who took the name Noble Drew Ali, in Newark in 1913)56 and the
Addeynu Allehe Universal Arabic Association (founded by a disciple of
Drew Ali, James Lomax Bey, who took the name Muhammad Ezaldeen, in
Detroit in 1941).5 In the 1920s, Muhammad Sadiq's Ahmadi movement

also drew African Americans because of its focus on racism and worked in
tandem with Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement
Association." In the cases, however, the courts generally call members of
any of these groups "Black Muslims," so it is difficult to know whether they

54 See infra Part II(A)(1).
55 Freeland,supra note 8, at 452.
56 The Moorish Science Temple of America, founded by Drew Ali, taught that African Americans
descended from Moroccans called Moors and therefore they should follow Islamic ethics. It
focused on combining African Christian elements with Islam to create an African American
community that is " 'a productive, self-reliant and law-abiding people as opposed to a lazy,
dependent or rebellious people."' Jamie J. Wilson, Islam among Urban Blacks: Muslims in
Newark, New Jersey, A Social History, 95 J. AFR. AM. HIST. 460, 460-61 (2007) (book review).
57 Ezaldeen founded AAUAA as a breakaway group in 1941; it was "very likely the first black
Sunni organization in Newark." Tracing his people's roots to Ham in the Old Testament, this sect
"strictly adhered to the 'five pillars of Islam,"' only to splinter into two groups at Ezaldeen's death
in 1957. Michael Nash, the historian chronicling this period, notes that the split in Ezaldeen's sect
coincided with the rise of the Nation of Islam." Wilson, supranote 56, at 460-61.
58 Historian Edward Curtis attributes the establishment of the Nation of Islam in 1930 to Wallace
D. Fard, whose successors were Elijah Poole and then Elijah Muhammad. See EDWARD E. CURTIS
IV, MUSLIMS IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 31-32, 36-37 (2009).
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are speaking about the Nation of Islam or one of these other branches of
American Islam.
Taken as a whole, the way in which courts describe cases involving
"Black Muslims" conveys the sense that the combination of "Black" and
"Muslim" is more threatening to the community than either of those
identifications alone. Courts appear to accept the characterization of the
"Black Muslim" sect as a particularly intimidating, theologically rigid, and
potentially violent form of Islam. A dissenting judge in State v. Cade paints
an unusually explicit and disapproving picture of these assumptions about
Black Muslims:
The Muslim cult, also known as Islam, of which [defendant
Cade] is the "Minister" in Monroe is a militant Negro group
organized-on a national basis holding meetings where its
members expound the supremacy of the Negro race. White
people are referred to in their doctrine as "devils." They are
strong believers in the separation of the races and consider
the integration of the races to be contrary to the laws of
nature and the laws of their God. They are strongly
antichristian and feel that Christianity and the government
of the United States have been in part responsible for the
slavery, hardships and suffering they have endured. The
Muslim leaders advocate a program whereby they expect
the Federal Government to "turn over" to them enough land
within the United States to accommodate [sic] the
20,000,000 Negroes of this country in order that they might
live separate and apart from the whites as a "nation within
a nation." This territory, it is preached, is due the Negroes
because they have lived in this country as slaves for 310
years "without a pay day" and that should be payment
enough for the lands they feel they are entitled to.5 9

State v. Cade, 153 So. 2d 382, 394 (La. 1963) (Summers, J., dissenting). The majority in State
v. Cade attempts to provide a more neutral (if clearly flawed) history or description of "the Black
Muslims," explaining, "[i]nsofar as the record shows, Islam is a religion. It has been practiced in
the United States for 32 years. Temples, or mosques, have been established in a number of cities.
The sect worships one god, called Allah, and believes that Elijah Muhammad, leader of the sect,
is his messenger. The faith and practice of the sect embrace an afterlife, prayer, charity, and
fasting. Physical fitness is encouraged. The sect is opposed to integration of the races. In fact, it
advocates a complete racial separation. To accomplish this purpose, it seeks land from the United
States government for the settlement of negroes." Id. at 388.
5
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1. Legends: The Black Muslim Riots and Khaalis Assassinations
Two notorious case studies-one from Louisiana and one from
Washington, D.C.-illustrate the power and reach of these assumptions
about African American Muslims. The first-a group of cases which came
to be known as the "Black Muslim riots"-became almost iconic in later
Louisiana criminal cases.
On January 10, 1972, African Americans, variously described as
"Muslims" or "Black Muslim militants," blocked North Boulevard in
downtown Baton Rouge's African American district by parking their cars
across the street.60 When the police began to try to "disperse 'Muslim'
demonstrators blocking the street" (as the Louisiana Supreme Court termed
them), five individuals were killed-including two deputy sheriffs and
"three of the defendants' alleged co-conspirators"-and a TV reporter was
"severely beaten" into unconsciousness.6 1
According to news reports, the Baton Rouge confrontation may have
started as a fistfight; a police captain apparently fired the first shot after
witnessing a militant pull a pistol from his jacket, and the victim was "cut
down by a barrage of police buckshot." 62 The militants returned fire,
resulting in the deaths and alleged wounding of four other police officers
and 27 civilians. 63 As the court describes it, "[this outbreak of violence had
significant effects upon the community which were the subject of extensive
national and local publicity," 64 and resulted in a city curfew and National

60 State v. Beavers, 394 So. 2d 1218, 1221 (La. 1981).
61 Although there is a discrepancy in reports about the number of deaths, the cases seem to use
this number. See, e.g., State v. West, 491 So. 2d 868, 871 (Miss. 1982); Beavers, 394 So. 2d at
1224; State v. Bell, 315 So. 2d 307, 308 (La. 1975).
62 See Jon Nordheimer, Racial Tension Rises in Baton Rouge as Versions ofShootout that Killed
Four Vary, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 1972), https://www.nytimes.com/1972/01/12/archives/racialtension-rises-in-baton-rouge-as-versions-of-shootout-that.html.
63 id
64 Bell, 315 So.2d at 308. In State v. Beavers, the court told more about the confrontation in the
process of rejecting defendants' hearsay objections:
Maurice Cockerham, a television news editor, testified that he heard
[Muslim leader] Upton speaking to a gathering crowd from the roof of a
Cadillac which had been used to block North Boulevard. According to this
witness, Upton referred to whites as white devils and as serpents and made
several references to killing whites which Upton said was required by their
teachings. Upton also told the crowd, "We have come here today to meet the
white devil and kill him." He then turned and pointed to Cockerham and two
other newsmen (including [reporter Bob] Johnson) saying, "There are three
of the white devils here today, but there will be more later." In Cockerham's
account, these remarks were made at approximately 12:30 P.M. Shortly
thereafter ... they were set upon by the crowd, and Johnson, who was unable
to escape, was severely beaten. After departing the scene, Cockerham
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Guard troops standing by after racial tensions rose. 65
What is most striking about this case is not the riot itself, but the fact
that the Louisiana courts, sifting through the various legal cases generated
by this incident, persisted in describing this as a "Black Muslim" riot. In
State v. Bell, a criminal case arising from this confrontation, the Louisiana
Supreme Court confronted the defendants' argument that references to their
religion inflamed the jury against them. 6 6 In seeking a change of venue,
defendants alleged "that government officials had commented publicly at
the time of the riot that they were satisfied the defendants were guilty of the
crime charged [and] should be severely punished." 6 ' The Louisiana
Supreme Court determined that defendants were eligible for a change of
venue if they could prove that a fair and impartial trial "could not be
obtained in the parish"68 in light of official comments at the time of the riot,
such as the warning that should the defendants not be convicted, "the
citizenry was ready and waiting should other [B]lack [M]uslims come to
Baton Rouge."6 9
Keeping the legend of the riot going, Bell was followed by two
different appeals in State v. Beavers. The first appeal regarding the
inconsistency in the jury verdict was successful, while the second appeal
alleging that Beavers' retrial placed him in double jeopardy was
unsuccessful.70 The Louisiana Supreme Court in both Beavers cases
continued to describe each case as "'[o]ne of the so-called 'Black Muslim
cases' which have been reviewed by this Court,"' even though the
defendant, an admitted "Black Muslim," testified that he had left after the
police dispersal order and was not involved when the shooting started." In
the Beavers cases, the court did not express concern over the possible bias
created by the defendant's identification as a "Black Muslim" or its own
characterization of these cases as the "so-called 'Black Muslim cases,"'
despite its acknowledgement of the notoriety of these cases. 72

contacted the police whose arrival minutes later led to the violent
confrontation which resulted in five deaths.
Beavers, 394 So. 2d at 1227.
65 Jon Nordheimer, 4 in Baton Rouge are Slain in Clash, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 1972),
https://www.nytimes.com/1972/01/1 1/archives/4-in-baton-rouge-are-slain-in-clash-2-deputiesand-2-blacks-die-and.html.
66
Bell, 315 So. 2d at 311-13.
6
1Id. at 311.
6
1Id at 313.
69 Id. at 311.
70 State v. Beavers, 364 So. 2d 1004, 1010 (La. 1978) [hereinafter Beavers I]; State v. Beavers,
394 So. 2d 1218, 1224 (La. 1981) [hereinafter Beavers I].
7 Beavers I, 364 So. 2d at 1004-1005; Beavers II, 394 So. 2d at 1221.
72
Beavers II, 394 So. 2d at 1221.
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Even the dissenting justices in State v. Eames, a 1978 case against one
of the rioters, who strongly claimed that defendants' constitutional rights
were violated, characterized the case as follows:
This criminal appeal raises the question of whether a black
defendant, charged with inciting to riot during a Black
Muslim street demonstration, was denied his rights to
individual dignity and equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Louisiana Constitution when the
prosecuting attorney admittedly used the State's
peremptory challenges to remove blacks from the petit jury
because he believed the fact of their race indicated they
were likely to be partial due to their susceptibility of
intimidation by radical elements of the black community.
This prosecution is one of the Baton Rouge "Black Muslim
cases," as denominated in defendant's brief and in popular
parlance.73
In 1982, this legend persisted in the perjury prosecution of a defense
witness for changing his testimony about whether the defendants were using
bullhorns prior to the riot; the court continued to call these "the so-called
'Black Muslim' trials" and the confrontation as between the police and
"Black Muslim demonstrators." 74 The legend followed to State v. Collier,
where the impartiality of a witness in a completely unrelated case was
questioned because "his older brother was a deputy sheriff who was killed
during the Black Muslim riot in January, 1972."" Despite this connection,
the court concluded "that [the witness] Wilder could be fair and impartial
to defendant [who was black, but not a Muslim], who was only about eight
years old at the time of his brother's death."7 6
The story of the riots even followed to an unrelated 1983 case
involving a black man who asked for a change of venue because of "articles
published in the Shreveport Times and the Sabine Index newspapers which

State v. Eames, 365 So. 2d 1361, 1364 (La. 1978), reh'g denied (1979). The Louisiana court
also heard the case of State v. Chenier, 343 So. 2d 177 (La. 1977), a thief unlucky enough to have
stolen from a man with the same name (Bob Johnson) as the brain-damaged reporter in the Baton
Rouge "Black Muslim" riots, a fact introduced in his trial. Id at 179. He argued that naming the
victim would prejudice his case because the jury would connect the two cases, even though they
were several years apart. Id The court concluded that the name was so common that there was no
reason to think the jurors would see a connection. Id.
74 State v. West, 419 So. 2d 868, 871-72 (La. 1982).
75 State v. Collier, 522 So. 2d 584, 588 (La. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 533 So.2d 815 (La.
1989).
76 id
7

36

REVIEW OFLA WAND SOCIAL JUSTICE

[Vol. 28:1

identified the defendants as 'Black Muslim' murder suspects." 77 One
defendant, Vivian Kahey, testified that he believed white people were
"'devils,' but that he was not a Black Muslim." 78 Despite the headline that
falsely identified him as such, accompanied by an article that "explained the
tenets of the Black Muslim faith, including the belief that 'Christianity was
a white man's religion, and the white man was a devil,"' the Court held that
the trial was not "utterly corrupted" by these stories which ran over a year
before the beginning of the trial.79 It cited, among other things, the
testimony of the publishers of the newspapers that they had not heard about
any prejudice in the community as a result of these stories."o
A second notorious case, Christian v. United States,"' was a mass
murder that still reverberates in American courts, ostensibly because of the
Muslim sect rivalry involving a former secretary of the Nation of Islam who
had founded his own temple, which was financed in part by follower and
basketball legend Lew Alcindor (a.k.a. Kareem Abdul-Jabbar).8 2 The court
described the case as follows:
[A]pproximately eight armed men entered a house at 7700
16th Street, N.W., and proceeded to rob, shoot, or drown
every person present. Seven persons, including five
children, were brutally murdered; two others were
n State v. Kahey, 436 So. 2d 475, 480 (La. 1983).
78 Id.
79

Id. at 482.
80 Id. at 482-83 (noting also that the trial court did not find prejudice in State v. Bell, even though
"the massive publicity which had been given to the Black Muslim riots in Baton Rouge several
years before the trial resulted in difficulty in selecting a jury."). See State v. Hills, 377 So. 2d
1218, 1219 (La. 1979) (in which an African American rape defendant unsuccessfully argued that
the police had falsely arrested him because they were prejudiced against all blacks by a recent
encounter with a group of Black Muslims); Commonwealth v. Colon, 299 A.2d 326, 327 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1972) (demonstrating the assumption that black Muslims and the police have a
longstanding violent relationship where the question was whether the police commissioner should
have been allowed to sit on a case involving the attempted murder of a police officer. The court
noted that "[t]he problem is claimed to be accentuated by the circumstance that one of the
appellants was a Black Muslim."); see also Fentis v. State, 528 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. 1975) (appeal
on the unrelated question of whether defendant's alleged shooting of police officers previously
was relevant to prove that he shot the victim police officer in question). The dissent, which
determined that there was no harmful error in asking about the previous shootings since they
elicited no testimony against the defendant, felt the need to state: "Also, in the present record there
was some evidence that appellant was a [B]lack [M]uslim. There was an attempt to show
that [M]uslims hated police officers. Evidence of the other shooting, if the State could have
developed it, would have been admissible to show bias and hatred toward a class-police
officers." Id. at 594.
8 Christian v. United States, 394 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1978).
82 For Alcindor's own story of his conversion and later break with his teacher, Hammas AbdulKhaalis, see Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, Why I ConvertedtoIslam, AL JAZEERA (March 29, 2015,2:00
AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/3/why-i-converted-to-islam.html.
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seriously wounded. The home was the residence of Calipha
Hamaas Abdul Khaalis and the headquarters of the
Orthodox Hanafi Muslims. The government's theory at
trial was that the murders were the culmination of a
conspiracy by members of the "Nation of Islam," the socalled "Black Muslims," to seek revenge against Hamaas
Khaalis for his criticism of Elijah Muhammad, then leader
of the Nation of Islam. Khaalis had voiced his disapproval
of -Elijah Muhammad in two letters sent to Nation
of Islam mosques throughout the United States."
The trial court also found that the assailants must be Black Muslims,
for the name on the assassination note, "Brother Lieutenant John 38X ... is
of the type received by one who has joined the Nation of Islam." 84
This mass murder, which came to be popularly known as the 1973

Christian,394 A.2d at 9.
Id. The court also refused to declare a mistrial after Khaalis' testimony as follows:
By the prosecutor:
Q: Now, Mister Khaalis, what is your profession, at the house?
A: The Masheer.
Q: And, what does "Masheer" mean?
A: The guide, the director, spiritual advisor. The man who defends the faith.
The man who knows tricksters and murders and gangsters that deviate on
Islam.
Q: I'll ask you sir, now if you will direct your attention back to January 18th.
Mr. Khaalis: You don't have to smile, Mister. [Khaalis was apparently
referring to one of the defense lawyers.]
The Court: Wait a moment, Mister Khaalis.
Mr. Khaalis: I don't want him smiling and smirking.
The Court: Mister Khaalis, please. Mister Khaalis, just listen to the questions
and respond to the questions. Look at Mister Evans and listen to his questions
carefully and respond to the questions.
Mr. Khaalis: I will respond to the questions, Your Honor.
At this point, a bench conference was requested. While counsel were
approaching the bench and the witness was stepping down from the stand,
the record reflects the following:
[Mr. Khaalis stepped down from the witness stand.]
Mr. Khaalis: It's over. It's over.
The Court: Mister Khaalis.
Mr. Khaalis: You killed my babies.
The Court: Mister Khaalis. Mister Jones [the marshal], would you please
escort Mister Khaalis to the witness room during the bench conference.
Mr. Khaalis: You killed my babies. And shot my women.
The Court: Now, Mister Khaalis, please.
Mr. Khaalis: They killed them.
The Court: Mister Khaalis, control yourself and please leave the courtroom.
Leave the courtroom.
Id. at 21-22. See Khallis v. United States, 408 A.2d 313, 320-21 (1979).
83

84
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Hanafi Muslim Massacre, 85 was met by a truly frightening response by
victim Khaalis in March 1977 that became known as the Hanafi Siege. 86
Khaalis created three armed hostage situations, involving as many as 160
hostages, at the B'nai B'rith headquarters in Washington, D.C, an Islamic
cultural center, and the District Building where the Washington, D.C. mayor
and city council had offices.8 7 Khaalis demanded that the movie
"Mohammad, Messenger of God" not be shown in New York or elsewhere
in the United States (a demand complied with when the movie was
withdrawn from circulation), and that the convicted murderers of Khaalis'
family and those convicted of murdering Malcolm X be turned over to the
Khaalis group." Purporting to achieve Islamic justice, Khaalis explained,
"We will fight to the death ... The situation is one that Allah is in command
... Listen to me clearly throughout the country, it can get worse! Are you
listening? Throughout the country, it could get worse!" 8 9
Commonwealth v. Brown90 involved the alleged murder of a police
informant in the Hanafi mass murder case. The court extended the
connection between the homicides and Islam, remarking on the defendant's
affiliation with "a religious sect commonly known as the Black Muslims,"
and the defendant's place as a "Lieutenant" in the military-like structure of
91
the organization with "responsibility for the enforcement of its tenets."
The implicit assumption of a relationship between the tenets and structure
of the Nation of Islam and the mass murder of its rivals lingers in the Brown
court's conclusion that "[tihere was a similarity in motive in that both
crimes were in retaliation for the victims' actions that displeased the
Black Muslims." 92

85

See,

e.g.,

Wikipedia

entry

for
"1973
Hanafi
Muslim
Massacre,"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973_HanafiMuslimmassacre (last visited July 25, 2018).
86 See Frank Jackman et al., Hanafi Siege: Gunmen RaidD.C Buildings in 1977, Killing One and
Wounding
at
Least
12,
N.Y.
DAILY
NEws
(Mar.
10,
1977),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/hanafi-siege-gunmen-raid-buildings-1 977-article1.2994339.
8

7 id

88 Id.; Khaalis v. United States, 408 A.2d 313, 320-21 (D.C. 1979). Khaalis told some of the

hostages, "he had asked Allah for a hundred hostages and Allah had presented him with one
hundred and three" and that "this was a 'holy war.' He said, "Be prepared to die because many of
you will die and heads will be blown, brains will be blown out and heads will roll! . . . In a holy
war there are no innocent victims. Men, women and children die in holy wars, and if you have any
sense you will pray to your God and be prepared to die.'. . . Khaalis blamed the Jews for the fact
that the murderers of his family were not dead, because the Jews controlled the banks, the
newspapers, and the media." Khaalis, 408 A.2d at 323.
89 Jackman, supra note 86.
90 Commonwealth v. Brown, 393 A.2d 414 (Pa. 1978).
9
Id. at 416.
92 id
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The defendants in the Hanafi Siege also resurface in United States v.
Hamid, in which the prisoner claimed duress from the Khaalis prison
network not to allocute to his crime or seek a sentence reduction." His
attorney, whose family was threatened along with Hamid's, claimed that
asking for a separate hearing on a sentence reduction would have made
Khaalis "aware that [Hamid] disobeyed his orders and would have sought
to kill him.

. .

. Hanafi Muslims are strong in their faith and are 'very close

knit in both the Federal [prison] system and the District of Columbia and
other state [prison] systems."'94 For example, he claimed, probably
correctly, that Khaalis was "dictating orders, by telephone to the Hanafi
Muslims within the prison system."95
2. Black Muslims as Subversive, Violent, or Criminal
These two notorious cases, discussed supra in Part II(A)(1), are not the
only cases in which there are statements or inferences that Black Muslims
are violent, criminal, or subversive.96 For example, in State v. Cade, the
Louisiana Supreme Court heard the appeal of an African American Muslim
sentenced to six years in prison for criminal anarchy.97 He was punished for
teaching that:
[T]he Negro under our system of government 'gets nothing
but slavery, hell and death' and that a separate and new
nation and government must be established by the Negro
people and that this nation and government shall be within
the United States, and that this Negro nation is entitled to
the State of Louisiana and other southern states because
'we feel that 310 years of slave labor that our parents have
undergone in America should be enough pay', and that the
owners of such land today have no rights or interest, and
that such new nation and government must be established
whether by violence or any other unlawful means within
the boundary of the United States.98
Cade's conviction was also premised on the finding that his religious
9 United States v. Hamid, 531 A.2d 628, 641-42 (D.C. 1987).
94 id.

95 Id at 642.
96 See, e.g., State v. Burton, 490 P.2d 1189, 1191 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971), for a decision in which
the court rejected defendant's claim that he plead guilty under duress because, among other things,
it was unpleasant for him to be placed in a cell next to the Black Muslims while he was held
without bail.
9 State v. Cade, 153 So. 2d 382, 384 (La. 1963).
9 Id.
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sect, "being known as Muslims or Islam," was a subversive organization
and, thus, that his teaching and leadership of these ideas in his religious
community was a crime.99 Indeed, it appears that prior to this incident, the
police chief was surveilling and investigating the "Black Muslims" for
subversive activity. 00 A key piece of evidence in the crime was a
blackboard from which the defendant taught:
As one faces the board, a flag of the United States appears
on the left side. Underneath the flag is the inscription,
"Christianity", and a cross. Immediately under the cross are
the words, "Slavery Hell Death". To the right of these
words is a tree from which a black person is suspended by
a rope over a fire. On the right of the board is depicted the
flag of Islam. Under it is the inscription, "Freedom Justice
Equality". In the center of the board is the question: "Which
one will survive the war of Armageddon?""o'
The appellate court, attempting to pull back from the prosecutor's
implication that this board demonstrated that an armed insurrection was
likely, noted that the battle of Armageddon that Cade referred to was also a
story accepted by Christians, and that, "[n]eedless to say, it has no reference
to civil strife, unless it is employed in a special, or extraordinary, sense."1 0 2
The dissent, however, disagreed with this characterization, remarking:
It is my opinion that it is subject to the interpretation that
opposition to the government by unlawful means is a tenet
of the Muslim group. Otherwise, why is the question asked:
Will the United States (represented by the United States
flag) or Islam (represented by the other flag) survive the
final conflict between these two ideals-the War of
Armageddon (an unlawful means)? There seems to be no
doubt that the designers of the board sought to instill
into those who viewed the board a desire for "Islam" to

9 Id
in In a debate over whether the blackboard on which defendant had made some of these claimed
subversive comments should be excluded from evidence because of lack of a warrant, the Court
noted that "the Chief of Police, who was investigating the sect for subversive activities, had gone
to the temple in response to an invitation to the public to attend a meeting. While there, he and his
officers were attacked by the defendant and other Muslims. During the course of making arrests
for battery, the Chief of Police took possession of the blackboard, which was on display in the
building. The evidence of record does not establish that the blackboard is the property of the
defendant. Under these circumstances, we cannot perceive how the action of the Chief of Police
constitutes a search and seizure as to the defendant." Id. at 388.
1o1 Id.
102 Id
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survive; for beneath that flag are listed "Freedom Justice
Equality", whereas beneath the United States flag are listed
"Slavery Hell Death, etc." The inference to be gained is that
the government represented by the United States flag
should not survive, that is, it should be destroyed and a final
conflict (War of Armageddon) will be the means of
accomplishing that end. 0 3
The Cade prosecutor also attempted to get a 13-year-old witness to
testify to his Islamic mentor's subversive teachings about alleged overthrow
of the state of Louisiana and confiscation of state land. 10 4 The prosecutor
persisted in questioning him, despite the witness's repeated avowals that
neither the defendant nor anyone else at his mosque had made such
arguments, nor had they advocated creating a new government for "the
negro race" or that Muslims should prefer the flag of Islam to the flag of the
United States." Indeed, another witness testified:
Our leader has never advocated [taking government land
by force], in fact he couldn't advocate that. This is contrary
to the religion that he teaches and furthermore we have
nothing with which to take any land from anyone. We are
forbidden to carry arms on our person, to have them in our
temples or even in our homes. No Muslim carries arms, so
I don't know how this could even be thought of, that we
would seek to take something by force of arms. We don't
have the means to do such a thing and we don't advocate it
any how [sic]. 106
Though the trial court permitted a conviction despite these witness
statements, the appellate court reversed Cade's conviction, somewhat
ambivalently distinguishing between religious belief and subversive
advocacy, declaring:
The state asserts, however, that the teachings of this sect
foster racial hatred. That the doctrinal content may arouse
racial prejudice cannot be gainsaid. However, teachings of
this nature are not denounced as a crime by the instant
statute. The danger sought to be averted is the overthrow of
organized government by violence or other unlawful
means. The free exercise of religion, whether it be in the

103

Id at 394 (Summers, J., dissenting).

104 Id. at 388.
105
106

Id. at 388-89.
Id. at 390.
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Judeo-Christian tradition or not, has been wisely accorded
constitutional protection under our system of government.
Religious freedom is deeply in grained [sic] in our social,
religious, and governmental institutions. As fundamental as
religious freedom may be, however, it creates no immunity
for crime committed under the guise of religious dogma.
The advocacy of any doctrine, although denominated
religious, which contemplates the overthrow of established
government by violence or terrorism falls under the
proscription of law. Having found no evidence in the record
to establish that violence or other unlawful means have
been advocated by the defendant or his organization, we
conclude that an error of law has been committed.107
The Cade prosecutor's implication of impending insurrection by black
Muslims is not an isolated case. A Texas appellate court affirmed and then
reversed the capital conviction of a defendant identified in testimony as a
Black Muslim in Joyner v. State."os In his closing statement, the prosecutor
referred to recent riots in the African American community in Detroit: "If
any of you people read newspapers or have ears, you know what's going on
in this community, or in the United States ... we are on the verge of anarchy
in this country." 09
References to terrorism or war by Muslims abroad have similarly been
permitted in completely unrelated cases involving American Muslims. In
Ahmad v. State, a 1992 child abuse prosecution of a father who beat his son
and tied him to a bedpost with duct tape, the prosecutor analogized the child
to a hostage or a prisoner of war in his closing argument.i1 o Defendant
argued that, given that he was Muslim, the allusions were used to inflame
the jury against him, by bringing to mind some Muslim-majority countries,
like Lebanon, where Americans had been taken hostage and tortured. "' The
appellate court decided that this link would be unlikely given that the
metaphor "is not name-calling or a label on Abdusabr Ahmad's overall
character. The State did not state per se that Abdusabr Ahmad was an Arab
captor. The State did not even compare Abdusabr Ahmad to Arab captors.

107 Id at 391.
108 Joyner v. State, 436 S.W.2d 141, 143-44 (Tex. 1968).

109 Id at 144 (in the original opinion, this comment was called "in poor taste" but not reversible
error).
I10 Ahmad v. State, 603 So. 2d 843, 846 (Miss. 1992) ("You know, we get incensed when we hear

that our soldiers are treated a particular way when they're captured and made prisoners of war,
when people in our embassies are captured by people and abused. There's no hesitation on us to
see that for what it is-torture, beatings. And the same thing happened to this child.").
111 Id.
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The State simply compared [the child]'s emotions to that of a prisoner of
war or hostage."1 12
In State v. Robinson, a trial judge tried to explain the heightened
courtroom security in a criminal trial of a Muslim, referencing the need for
such security during the Gulf War.' 13 The judge attempted to correct this
misstep by saying, "I want to be absolutely certain that you understand that
any reference I make to security or the war has absolutely nothing to do
with this case."" 4 Because the appellate court did not believe that the jury
would draw a connection to the war or even that the jury knew that the
defendant was a Muslim, the court held that the defendant did not suffer
prejudice."'
In a similar reference in a stalking case, State v. Mehralian, a
prosecutor attempted to influence prospective jurors by asking one whether
he had heard of the Koran, "the bible of the Muslim faith," and the phrase
'"[d]eath to the infidel."" 6 He also asked the victim's father about the Koran
and what it meant to him."' The victim's father replied that one of the
teachings was "the complete rejection of anything non-Islamic.""' When
questioned by the court about his line of questioning, the prosecutor claimed
that its purpose was to explain the motive of the defendant in breaking into
his girlfriend's home."' The North Dakota Supreme Court overturned the
conviction on the basis of this questioning, stating:
These questions by the assistant state's attorney were
improper. They tended to incite anger against Mehralian,
who was an Iranian citizen in this country on a visa during
the time following the unlawful and unprecedented
takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran by Iranian
militants. The references to the Koran, to Mehralian's visa
status, to his statement to Mr. Swett, and finally to other
wrongs he may have committed (which were not

112

id
1 State v. Robinson, 662 A.2d 1295, 1298-99 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995), rev'd, 676 A.2d 384
(1996).
1'4 id
115 Id at 1299; State v. Calloway, Nos. 65431,65432, 65433, 1994 WL 236226, at *21 (Ohio Ct.
App. May 26, 1994) (where the court decided against defendant based on his counsel's failure to
object, the prosecutor claimed that "[m]osque leaders who were responsible for discipline at the
[m]osque sought to cover up the situation by attempting to place the blame for the crimes on
persons who are not presently affiliated with the [m]osque.").
116 State v. Mehralian, 301 N.W.2d 409, 413 (N.D. 1981).
''7 Id.

118 Id.
''9 Id.
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established at trial) were highly prejudicial.1 20
The implication of a relationship between the "Black Muslim" faith
and lower-level violent crime surfaces as well in cases in this period. Some
courts tell stories of physical altercations involving "Black Muslims" that
seem to analogize the Nation of Islam to a violent military unit. One such
case is State v. Calloway, in which two men alleged that after they stole
leather coats from members of the Nation of Islam, those members
kidnapped them and subjected them to intensive interrogation and abuse.121
The appellate court dismissed defendants' claim that a prosecutor's crossexamination was grounds for overturning the jury verdict despite the many
prejudicial questions asked: for example, whether the witness's name was
given to him by controversial Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan, who
called Judaism a gutter religion; whether the Nation was organized into
military ranks and did military drills; whether the Nation was Orthodox
Islam; and whether it taught (like Orthodox Islam) that thieves must have
their hands cut off.122 The appellate court noted: "We fail to see how the
exchange [about whether the mosque expected an assault] negatively
affected the overall fairness of the trial, particularly where the prosecution,
in its closing argument, stated that [the Nation of Islam] was not on trial."'23
Another such case implying the violent militarization of the Nation of Islam
is State v. Nur, in which three young men allegedly encountered a group of
"ten black male Muslims .

.

. all wearing robes and skull caps" who came

out of "a building owned by Muslims" to punch and stab the complainants
after they urinated behind the building, even though they had already
apologized to the first person who saw and confronted them.12 4 The court
did not seem to notice any possibility for prejudice in this description.' 25
In Commonwealth v. Hoskins, we see a prosecutor's attempt to link
Islam with drug trafficking. 26 In Hoskins, the prosecutor persisted in asking
two witnesses questions linking Islam with crime.' 27 A female witness was
questioned about:
whether her mother was presently selling drugs; whether

120

Id at 418.

Calloway, 1994 WL 236226, at *1
Id. at *7-*8. The witness answered "yes" to all but the question about hands being cut off,
although the judge sustained an objection to a reference to Judaism. Id.
123 Id. at *8, The prosecutor also established that the Nation of Islam was paying the defendants'
attorney fees. Id. at *8.
124 State v. Nur, No. 57132, 1990 WL 84288, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. June 21, 1990).
125 Id. at *5 (rejecting defendants' allegations of prosecutorial misconduct).
126 Commonwealth v. Hoskins, 403 A.2d 521, 526-28. (Pa. 1979).
127 Id at 526.
121

122
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the victim told her the "Muslims" were looking for him;
whether the victim sold drugs from his house; whether the
victim wore a bullet-proof vest; whether she belonged to
the "Muslims" as did the victim; and, whether the victim
was in fact a "Muslim."1 2 8
A male witness was questioned about whether he was involved with
"the 'Muslim' religion" despite the fact, as the court acknowledges, that the
relevant parties' religious affiliations were not alleged to be relevant by the
prosecutor.1 2 9 The appellate court concluded that commingling testimony
about defendant's and his witnesses' drug trafficking with "the suggestion
that [they] were all associated with a religion which has a reputation for
criminal activity" was "clearly improper and inflammatory.""' In another
drug case, Commonwealth v. Ashley, the court dismissed the defendant's
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, made on the basis that the lawyer
had failed to object to three references by a state trooper to the defendant's
religion.' 3 ' One of them was the trooper's statement that the probable cause
information was "that drugs were coming from Philadelphia, Muslim drug
traffic was coming from Philadelphia to that residence." 3 2 The court
justified its ruling against the defendant by explaining: "In our view, these
isolated statements concerning the Muslims in relation to the circumstances
giving rise to appellant's arrest cannot be considered the equivalent of a
statement that appellant was a Black Muslim or was associated with that
group."' 33 The court apparently would have concluded that a direct
statement that defendant was a Black Muslim was prejudicial, presumably
on the theory that Black Muslims were feared or loathed by the jury more
than other Muslims.1

34

On rare occasions, appellate judges will acknowledge why this link
between Islam and crime or violence is problematic. In her dissent in State

128 id

129 Id. at 527-28.
130 Id. at 528. See also People v. Lowrance, 377 N.Y.S.2d 484, 484 (App. Div. 1975),
in which
the court held that a prosecutor attempted to racially prejudice the jury by asking the defendant's
ex-wife questions about "'Black Muslims' which were not material to the issues," as well as "what
does the X stand for in a person's name" in order to establish the defendant's "membership in the
Black Muslims," in violation of his right to a fair trial. Id. at 485. In State v. Allen, 429 S.W.2d
697, 698-99 (Mo. 1968), the court accepted the defendant's claim that the prosecutor's reference
to him as a black Muslim was prejudicial-especially since it was not true-but held that it was
cured by the judge's instruction to the jury: "Members of the jury, you will disregard the statement
made by the Officer in regard to membership in the Black Moslem."
131 Commonwealth v. Ashley, 419 A.2d 775, 776 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
132 id
13'3
at 777.
134 See id.
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v. Smith-despite her suggestion that defendant may have opened the door
to the jury's consideration of his faith-Justice Lundberg Stratton was
forthright about the effect of this testimony on defendant's ability to get a
fair trial:
Some people believe, rightly or wrongly, that the tenets of
the Nation of Islam urge militant violence, a powerful
image that could have infected the jury's deliberation.
Without a careful rooting out of any potential juror who
harbored prejudicial racial or religious views, or who had
formed preconceived prejudices about . . . the Islamic
movement, there is no way to be sure that the jurors who
deliberated were truly fair and impartial.13 5
3. Muslims as Untruthful
In the cases in this period, appellate courts grappled with prosecutorial
attempts to introduce Islam to suggest that witnesses or defendants were
untruthful, or that they would lie to save members of their faith. Sometimes
prosecutors used a defendant's adherence to Islam to impeach the
defendant's credibility, on the theory that if the defendant testified to being
a Muslim but then violated one of its precepts, it could evidence dishonesty
and suggest that the defendant is lying about other things more relevant to
the case. Under this standard, of course, any person who claimed allegiance
to a faith and then violated one of its tenets would presumably be lying
about faith commitments, which would make most people liars since
religious people do fall short of their religion's teachings.
In Commonwealth v. Brown, the prosecutor engaged in an extended
colloquy with the witness to impeach the defendant's and witness's
credibility.' 36 The appellate court's description of the trial record is set out
here at length to illustrate the persistence of the prosecutor in trying to
establish-apparently successfully for the jury-that these Muslims were
untrustworthy liars because they had breached tenets of their faith as the
prosecutor understood them:

Q. [by Assistant District Attorney] When you say 'brother',
what do you mean by 'brother'?
[Defense counsel]: Objection.
THE COURT: Overruled.

135 State v. Smith, 731 N.E.2d 645, 662 (Ohio 2000) (Lundberg Stratton, J., dissenting).
136 Commonwealth v. Brown, 372 A.2d 887, 890 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977).
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[Assistant District Attorney]:
Q. What do you mean by that?
A. More or less like my religion, we call each other brother,
that is what I mean.
Q. Any relation-you're a Muslim; is that correct?
[Defense counsel]: Yes.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes, I'm a Muslim.
[Assistant District Attorney]:
Q. THAT is why you refer to him as brother. That is why
you affirm and now swear; is that correct?
[Defense counsel]: Objection.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: That is correct.
[Assistant District Attorney]:
Is it part of your religion, do you have an X in your
middle name; is that correct?
[Defense counsel]: Objection.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

Q.

[Assistant District Attorney]:
Q. Does that mean that

you're

actually

full

fledged Muslim?
[Defense counsel]: Objection.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
[Assistant District Attorney]:
Q. You're a full brother in the Muslim Mosque, I take it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And yet, what is the significance of the X?
[Defense counsel]: Objection.
THE COURT: I don't know how relevant all this is.
[Assistant District Attorney]: I think it is, Your Honor, I
will get to it shortly.
THE COURT: All right, overruled.
[Assistant District Attorney]:
Q. What is the significance of the X?
A. What is the significance of the X?
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[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, I have a standing objection
to any of this line.
THE COURT: We have heard it,

...

[Defense counsel]: Regarding religion, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.
[Assistant District Attorney]:
Q. What is the significance?
A. Like I am X, considered X-smoker, X-drinker, Xanything X.
Q. It signifies that you have been purified, in other words?
A. I other words, changed in my ways.
Q. As a result of your religion, you're not allowed to go into
bars, are you?
A. I am. I can go in bars, as far as sitting down and drinking,
no, sir.
Q. Aren't you disallowed from even going into a place that
sells alcohol, under your religion?
A. No, sir, long as I don't get involved with it myself.
Q. You can go in there as long asA. Yes, sir.
Q. As a matter of fact, I believe in your religion, one of the
basic tenets is that the law of the city and county does not
apply to the brothers; is that correct?
A. Sir?
THE COURT: I am going to sustain that objection.
Subsequently, the prosecutor asked the witness if he
knew any other people in the bar that night. When the
witness replied that he knew one person, the prosecutor
asked if this person was also a Muslim. The witness
responded affirmatively. The prosecutor then asked if this
person had an 'X' in his middle name and what this person
was doing in the bar. The witness answered that his
acquaintance did not have an 'X' in his name and that he
was selling jewelry. Finally, the prosecutor asked the
witness if appellant were a 'brother'. The lower court once
again overruled defense counsel's objection and the
witness gave an affirmative reply. The prosecutor asked if
the Muslim religion prohibited appellant's presence in the
bar unless he was doing business. Over objection, the
witness stated that this was correct. The witness also said
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that he did not know if appellant had been doing business
in the bar....
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked [another]
witness if he belonged to a Muslim sect and if his faith
prohibited his presence in a bar. Defense counsel objected
to both questions; the lower court overruled his objections
and the witness gave affirmative answers. The prosecutor
then asked three times if the presence of the witness in the
bar meant that he was willing to bend his religious
principles. After the witness answered the first question
affirmatively, the lower court sustained objections to the
second and third questions.
Subsequently, the prosecutor returned to the subject
of the Muslim faith of the witness. He asked the witness if
he had seen a couple of 'brothers' enter the bar. The witness
said yes. The prosecutor then asked if the witness got into
trouble because these two other 'brothers' visited the bar;
the witness said no. Finally, the prosecutor asked: 'I take it
this isn't one of the strongest principles of your religion?'
The lower court sustained defense counsel's objection."'
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Mimms, the prosecutor in a capital
murder trial cross-examined a defense witness about whether he and the
defendant were both Muslims, implying that the witness was partial to the
defendant because of their religious relationship.' Noting that the
defendant took advantage of this line of questioning to establish that Islam
required witnesses to testify truthfully, the intermediate appellate court
upheld the conviction.139 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned the
conviction, in part because of the trial court's questioning:
The Commonwealth contends that the questioning was
merely intended to show the friendly relationship between
1 Id. at 890-91; see also Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 629 n.3 (1979), in which
the prosecutor attempted to discredit an alleged battered wife who shot her husband on the basis
that her husband-an Islamic convert-would not have battered because it was against his
religion. The prosecutor also introduced evidence that he had separated from his first wife because
of her refusal to "embrace the Koran." Id. at 629 n.5.
138 Commonwealth v. Mimms, 335 A.2d 516, 518 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1975), rev'don other grounds,
370 A.2d 1157 (Pa. 1977), rev'd, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), remandedto 385 A.2d 334 (Pa. 1978).
139 Id. at 519. Judge Hoffman, in dissent, noted: "The blatant means by which the religious
affiliation of appellant and his witness have been injected into this case bring to mind the words
of former Chief Justice Maxey ...: 'This is the first time the writer ever heard of any attorney
injecting into a case the religious affiliations of either a litigant or a witness. . . . If a witness'
religious belief cannot properly be injected into a judicial proceeding, a litigant's religious belief
certainly cannot be."' Id. at 520-21.
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Morrison and Mimms and was not intended to capitalize
upon the notoriety of the Muslim faith which obtains
locally. The statute is, however, expressly worded to
prevent the use of religious profession for the purpose of
affecting credibility. If, as the Commonwealth argues, the
questioning sought only to establish the friendship of the
two men, there were numerous other ways, equally
effective, to establish such a relationship without touching
upon religion.1 4 0
Similarly, in State v. Williams, the defendant's attorney unsuccessfully
objected to prosecutorial inquiries of a witness' association with defendant
Williams, whether Williams was the leader "of a black Muslim Group," and
whether the witness was testifying for Williams because Williams "told him
to testify," implying that their religious relationship was the reason that the
witness was willing to perjure himself for Williams. 14 1
In Commonwealth v. Lee, the court rejected the defense's argument
that the prosecutor had improperly asked the defendant questions about
Islam, implying that there was a question of whether the defendant
understood his obligation to tell the truth.1 4 2 The court suggested that the
prosecutor's questions "were simply designed to determine the effect of
Lee's religious beliefs on the oath he had taken as a witness."143
In State v. Roper, another rioting case, the defendant objected to the
introduction of evidence that he was associated with Muslims, claiming that
the prosecutor portrayed them as "a supposedly bad group of people who
started and controlled much of the riot."" The court, however, accepted the
prosecution's argument that linking defendant with Muslims who allegedly
started the riot evidenced his motive in assaulting the victims, rather than
his credibility; in the court's view, there was "no inference by the evidence
offered that Muslims as a group were dishonest," only that they had planned
and controlled the riot.1 45 Similarly, in People v. Hagan, the appellate court
Commonwealth v. Mimms, 385 A.2d 334, 335 (1978).
141 State v. Williams, 364 N.E.2d 1364, 1368 (Ohio 1977), vacated in part, 438 U.S. 911 (1978).
But see State v. Hobbs, No. 1-75-06-0892, 1-75-06-0895, 1-75-06-0900, 1-75-06-0905,1978 WL
185314, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 1978), in which a witness explained his recantation on the
basis that he blamed one man rather than the actual man responsible because the first man was not
a Muslim brother and the second man was.
142 Commonwealth v. Lee, 475 N.E.2d 363, 370 (Mass. 1985).
143 Id. The court once again seemed to justify the questioning by suggesting that the defendants
had left themselves open to questioning because "throughout the trial Shaw and Lee conspicuously
manifested their Muslim beliefs." Id. Ultimately, the court's decision rested on defense counsel's
failure to preserve the issue for review by objecting. Id.
1" State v. Roper, No. 94CA34, 1996 WL 140250, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 22, 1996).
I45 Id.
140
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held that reference to animosity between the defendant's sect of Islam and
Malcolm X was relevant if it went to prove that the murder for which the
defendant was connected grew out of hostility created by this religious
conflict. 14 6
B. JURY PREJUDICES ABOUT DISTINCTIVE MUSLIM PRACTICES

State courts have also struggled with whether to probe jury prejudices
about defendants' or witnesses' religious exercise, especially if they wore
distinctive clothing common to Muslims, refused to appear in court during
Friday prayers, or insisted on affirming the truth of their testimony rather
than being sworn in on a Bible or the Qur'an. Jury prejudices about Islam's
treatment of women have also factored into some decisions.
Remarks made or questions asked about "Muslim dress" elicited
conflicting decisions. In Commonwealth v. Bond, the appellate court had no
issue with a prosecutor's inquiry of a witness who was wearing a turban:
whether she was a "follower of a particular religious belief," which elicited
testimony that she was a Sunni Muslim.' 47 The court strongly disagreed that
this line of questioning was prejudicial and irrelevant, holding that it was
simply "an attempt to furnish an explanation for the witness's distinctive
headdress."' 4 8 By contrast, in People v. Mallory, the court found it
prejudicial to introduce 18 photographs of a defendant "in Muslim garb"
and sometimes carrying a weapon when it was unrelated to the case. 149
Questions about striking a juror because of a presumed association
with Islam have also come up. In Card v. United States, the court dismissed
an equal protection claim objecting to the exclusion of young black
jurors.'o The dissent noted that both the prosecutor and the trial court

146 People v. Hagan, 248 N.E.2d 588, 591 (N.Y. 1996).
147 Commonwealth v. Bond, 458 N.E.2d 1198, 1201 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984).
148

id.

149 People v. Mallory, No. 45736, 1983 WL 5596, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. July 28, 1983). In Ferrell
v. State, 536 A.2d 99, 109 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988), rev'don other grounds, 567 A.2d 937 (Md.
1990), while a trial judge's aggressive questioning gave rise to a successful appeal, only one
reference was made to Islam. The judge's first interruption of the defendant's testimony was to
ask, when the defendant mentioned a Kuti, "You mean a [M]uslim type thing?" apparently in
response to other testimony that the defendant was wearing a "[M]uslim type of head covering."
150 Card v. United States, 776 A.2d 581, 595 (D.C. 2001), rev'dand vacated, 863 A.2d 821 (D.C.
2004). Similarly, in People v. Anderson, 118 Cal. Rptr. 918, 921 (1975), the court permitted the
prosecutor to voir dire the jury on their attitudes toward Black Muslims. In the appellate court's
view, this was permissible because "[t]here was evidence that the offenses ... were based upon
defendant's dislike of members of the white race. To the extent that Black Muslims as a group or
individually harbor similar views, the district attorney was entitled to interpose questions to elicit
such information" from prospective jurors. Id. at 921 n.5. It was also permissible as a converse of
the prosecutor's question to the jury about whether they found the black race to be inferior-the
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'

assumed that because one juror had close-cropped hair and wore a white
shirt and bow tie, he must be a Muslim and a follower of Louis Farrakhan.' 5
The trial court allowed the strike of that juror as based on a "gut feeling," 52
which the appellate court affirmed as related to a "genuine race-neutral
concern regarding the potential juror's desire to hamstring any possible
conviction."1 53

In the few cases in which Muslims asked for court delays to perform
religious obligations, courts were generally not sympathetic. People v.
Monroe is an exception: in this case, after missing a day of trial because of
an epileptic seizure, a Muslim defendant did not appear at his trial the next
day-a Friday-because of his religious obligations, which upset a juror
who was dismissed for the day.' 5 4 Even though the juror was directed not to
make any negative inferences about the defendant's guilt from this delay,
she "expressed her impatience" and said "I personally feel I can't help but
draw inferences from it. It's not one day of emergency, it's two days. It
makes no sense."'" When the trial resumed the next Monday, the juror told
the judge, "'I am still angry about it' . . . 'Although I am angry, I don't think
56
it would effect [sic] my ability. I certainly have cooled off a lot."" The

judge, noting empathetically that the juror was frustrated about the delay,
suggested, however, "you don't have enough evidence to indicate to be
angry at the defendant," and refused to replace the juror.' The appellate
court overruled the trial judge's decision because of his failure to probe
whether the juror was "racially or otherwise invidiously biased against the
defendant" after her statement.' 5 8
In Commonwealth v. Mimms, a prosecutor attempted to influence the

court reasoned if the prosecutor could ask the former question, he could ask the question about
Black Muslims. Id. at 921.
151 Card, 776 A.2d at 610 (Ruiz, J., dissenting).
152 Id. at 589.

153 Id. at 595. Where, however, a court cured the problem by accepting a defendant's Batson
challenge to the exclusion of a Pakistani Muslim, the appellate court found no prejudice, even
though it held that prosecutors could exercise peremptory challenges based on religion. Perea
Velasco v. State, No. 01-96-01075-CR, 1999 WL 12792, at *2 (Tex. App. Jan. 14, 1999).
154 People v. Monroe, 620 N.Y.S.2d 390, 391 (App. Div. 1995); see also People v. Morgan, 697
N.Y.S.2d 259, 260 (App. Div. 1999), in which the trial court held that a defendant waived his right
to be present at the jury verdict when he requested a three-day delay in jury deliberations so that
he could attend Friday services at his mosque. In the appellate court's view, the fact that the trial
court had "made arrangements for the defendant to pray on Friday" adequately served his religious
needs. Id. The appellate court found a "compelling interest" in a fair trial to justify the refusal to
extend the jury's deliberations. Id.
1 Monroe, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
156 Id.
157

id.

158 id.
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jury by pointing out that a Muslim witness refused to swear, insisting on
affirming.15 ' The problem with this attempt to single out Muslims for
affirming rather than swearing was explained in United States v.
Kalaydjian, in which a government witness asked to affirm his testimony
rather than swearing on the Qur'an, and defense counsel asked to crossexamine him on why he refused to swear in order to cast doubt upon his
credibility. 6 o Rejecting the argument that Federal Rule of Evidence 610
permits evidence on witnesses' religious beliefs for purposes of impeaching
their truthfulness, the court held that the defense's attempt to brand a
witness as a liar because he refused to swear on his own sacred text was
prohibited. 16 ' The court held, in part, that testing the veracity of a witness
by pointing out his refusal to swear on a holy book would not make sense
unless it were proven that the witness was a devout Muslim "who believed
deeply in the Koran," which was clearly impermissible under the rule.1 62
In other cases involving religious claims that may have seemed
unusual or even manufactured to majority judges, the courts similarly made
short work of a defendant's claims. In Graham v. State, the defendant
requested that he be appointed a Muslim lawyer, or he would represent
himself.1 63 The judge denied the request for a Muslim lawyer, while
appointing him a standby public defender.'" There is no evidence that the
judge asked why the defendant wanted a Muslim lawyer; but the appellate
court treated the case as if the defendant had tried to make a personal
selection of an attorney he liked, rather than a religious issue.1 65
References to Muslims' treatment of women have also surfaced in

15 Commonwealth v. Mimms, 335 A.2d 516, 518 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975), rev'don other grounds,
370 A.2d 1157 (Pa. 1977), rev'd, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), remandedto 385 A.2d 334 (Pa. 1978). See
State v. Rodriquez-Garcia, 937 P.2d 446, 451-52 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997) (though not a case
involving Muslims, it discusses the problems of swearing and affirming in Kalaydjian, infra note
160). The court in Commonwealth v. Brown, 372 A.2d 887, 892 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977), pointed
this out as an example of the prejudicial behavior of the prosecutor in Mimms.
160 United States v. Kalaydjian,784 F.2d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 1986).
161 Id at 56-57.

162 Id. In Majid v. State, 713 S.W.2d 405, 413 (Tex. App. 1986), the court rejected defendant's
claim that references to his religion prejudiced his case on the basis that the prosecution had never
sought to make any arguments based on defendant's "Shiite Moslem religion ... or contemporary
world terrorist events;" they all came out in witness testimony that was not objected to, so
defendant waived these objections as a ground for appeal. One can see the dilemma of defense
counsel: If defense counsel does not object, defendant will waive his right to raise prejudicial
testimony or cross-examination as grounds for appeal; if defense counsel does object, defense
counsel may simply draw more attention to the defendant's status as a Muslim or imply that there
is something about being a Muslim that the jury should not know.
63 Graham v. State, 324 S.E.2d 518, 520 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
i6 id
165 Id
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defendants' trials. In People v. Jones, the appellate court began the opinion
dramatically, noting: "Defendant took three wives. They wed into the
Islamic faith. Defendant believed that the teachings of the
Holy Koran empowered him to beat his wives. So he beat all three of them.
Only two survived."' 66 The defense counsel was unable to procure an
Islamic law expert who would explain why the defendant's faith might in
some way justify or mitigate his beating one of his wives to death.' 6 7 But
the court turned aside any notion that defendant could have any defense
based on Islam:
We seriously doubt that anyone knowledgeable on Islamic
teachings would have proved helpful to this defense. Had
such an expert been found, had he explained the
righteousness of defendant's conduct or merely explained
how defendant may have believed that his actions
conformed to religious teachings, the expert would not
have changed the outcome. The sovereign State of Illinois
has a longstanding rule of law that prohibits the engagedin conduct. This society will not abide defendant's actions
regardless of the religious beliefs that may have motivated
them. If a religion sanctions conduct that can form the basis
for murder, and a practitioner engages in such conduct and
kills someone, that practitioner need be prepared to speak
to God from prison. 16 8
In Rahman v. State, the court considered whether a cross-examination
of the defendant's wife about his Muslim faith and the role of women in
Muslim countries prejudiced his trial in violation of his constitutional
rights.' 69 While the court opined that "the gratuitous injection of irrelevant
and potentially prejudicial ethnic and religious stereotypes at trial is never
appropriate, particularly when the State is the offender," the court held that
the defendant's failure to object at trial waived his right to complain. 7 0

166 People v. Jones, 697 N.E. 2d 457, 459 (111. App. Ct. 1998).
167 Id. at 460.
168 Id. The court therefore rejected the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel argument
based on counsel's failure to produce an imam or other Islamic expert to testify that he was within
his rights under Islamic law to beat his wife. Id.
169 Rahman v. State, 469 S.E.2d 450, 451 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
170 Id. The court held that this error did not amount to "plain error," sufficient to overcome the
failure to object. Id. at 451-52. Similarly, in People v. Mohammed, 542 N.Y.S.2d 82, 83 (App.
Div. 1989), in which the court agreed that the prosecutor made "a number of inflammatory and
irrelevant remarks, particularly in reference to defendant's Moslem culture and status as an alien"
that were "patently improper," the defendant's failure to object and his success on the objections
he did make waived any claim to have the verdict overturned.
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C. JUDGES' AND LAWYERS' PREJUDICE

The following cases demonstrate that it is not only juries who may
harbor exploitable biases against Muslims: their defense counsel, the
prosecutors, and judges themselves may make such remarks. In Barrett v.
State, involving the question of whether a possibly mentally ill Vietnam
veteran voluntarily waived his right to trial and pleaded guilty, the court
heard evidence from his second public defender about whether the
defendant had been sufficiently counseled about his rights."' The public
defender's testimony established that he had made a special effort to be
thorough with the defendant because:
quite a few of the people used the X [in their name as did
the appellant], and it stood for-the X was the unknown
name that they had been robbed of when slavery was
instituted. And usually it meant a Muslim. And we went
over those very carefully, because they were prone to file
writs and motions and that sort of thing. And so we knew
to cover it very carefully.172
In Ex parte Pink, in which a defense attorney appealed a contempt
citation issued for an unrelated reason, 17 3 both the prosecutor and defense
attorney expressed bias towards Muslims. In describing the courtroom
battle between the defense attorney and prosecutor, the court noted that
"[the defense attorney] testified that when 'black folk' walked into the
courtroom dressed in Muslim robes and caps, 'like Arabians' that 17[the
4
prosecutor] remarked, 'Look at those clowns. This must be a circus."'
Even judges are not immune from prejudice. In State v. Allen, a trial
judge became impatient with a Muslim defense witness who was called to
refute a charge against his wife for allegedly receiving a refund for a power
tool for which she had not paid.17 ' Because he would not remove his prayer
cap, the trial judge refused to let him testify, believing that he was violating
a state rule that required all persons attending court to be "dressed so as not

171 Barrett v. State, No. 02-C-01-9307-CR-00154, 1994 WL 25826, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan.
26, 1994).
172 Id. In People v. Johnson, 450 P.2d 265 (Cal. 1969), we see a rare recognition that police can
also harbor these prejudices. There, the defendant testified that during his police interrogation,
"they 'brought up this malice again and asked me, you know, was I a Muslim or something like
that; since there wasn't nothing taken it might have been I just went in and shot a white man down
for nothing."' Id. at 269.
" Exparte Pink, 746 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
174 Id. at 759 n.2.
15 State v. Allen, 832 P.2d 1248, 1249 (Or. Ct. App. 1992). The husband planned to testify that
he had purchased the tool and given it to his wife to return and seek a refund. Id.
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to detract from the dignity of the court."1 7 6
Perhaps surprisingly given other clothing cases, the appellate court in
Allen overturned the conviction based on the judge's refusal to accept an
offer of proof that the witness had a religious conviction requiring him to
wear the prayer cap.' The court held that a trial judge's "desire simply to
maintain a general dress code cannot justify an infringement of a criminal
defendant's right to present an exculpatory witness, unless the attire worn
by the witness would be disruptive or would create an atmosphere of
unfairness."" Although the appellate court directly rejected the
defendant's claim that her religious freedom was implicated by the refusal
to let the witness testify, it indirectly accepted the premise of the Sherbert
v. Verner testl79 as a practical matter, holding that this balance had to be
struck for the defendant unless the witness's reasons for wearing the cap are
"not substantial or are based on a belief asserted but not sincerely held,"
which the offer of proof would have established.'s
D. WiEN DEFENDANTS INTRODUCED EVIDENCE ABOUT ISLAM
Some defendants attempted to disassociate themselves from Islam or
even blame Islam for their crimes, especially the Nation of Islam, apparently
because they understood the possible prejudice they could encounter in that
association. In People v. Smith, the defendant made a lengthy speech about
the fact that he was not a Black Muslim in his request to represent himself
pro se.'"' In Mills v. State, the defendant, who was convicted of first-degree
murder and sentenced to death, made claims against both the judge and his
defense counsel, contending that the state "tried him for being a bad person,
a [M]uslim, a white hater, and a criminal."l82
In State v. Shamsid-Deen, a family rape case, a defendant similarly
fought back against a prosecutorial attempt to associate him with Nation of
Islam stereotypes.' The prosecutor interrogated the defendant at length
176 id.

'nId. at 1249-50.
1 7 8 Id at 1249.
17 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (holding that any burden on an individual's
free exercise of religion must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest).
80 Allen, 832 P.2d at 1249-50.
181 People v. Smith, 497 N.E.2d 689, 691 (N.Y. 1986) (Kaye, J., dissenting) ("I want to make it
absolutely clear that I am not a Black Muslim or a member of any Black Activist Groups, such as
the BLA; but on the contrary, I am a firm believer in the Constitution of the United States and the
laws of this country, but I believe that I am being railroaded here and that I am not receiving the
equal protection of the laws, nor am I receiving due process of law.") (internal quotations omitted).
182 Mills v. State, 507 So. 2d 602, 603 (Fla. 1987).
183 State v. Shamsid-Deen, 379 S.E.2d 842, 849 (N.C. 1989).
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about supposed Islamic beliefs that fathers were absolute authorities in their
households whom girls had to obey, that girls were forbidden to have
premarital sex except with their fathers, and that the defendant taught his
girls, with a sword in his hand, that they would have their heads cut off if
they lied.' 84 The father denied each of these claims and in exasperation
replied: "You keep saying black Muslims. There's no such thing as
black Muslims. We are Muslims, but we are not black Muslims. We are
members of the Islamic faith, who are Muslims nationwide. There's no such
thing as a black Muslim."

85

Courts tend to be quite unsympathetic to claims of unfairness or
prejudice when defendants voluntarily identify themselves as Muslim.' 8 6
For example, despite the prosecutor's badgering, the appellate court in
Shamsid-Deen found no prejudice against the defendant, noting that the
defendant had opened the door to this questioning by asking the victim
whether she was Muslim and stating that the question about fathers having
sex with their daughters "can in no way be construed as an insult to the
Islamic religion . . because the context makes clear that Muslim doctrine
forbids premarital sex."'87

Similarly, in State v. Brooks, the defendant testified that he was a
member of the Nation of Islam and was at a meeting at the temple when his
minister invited him to come to the minister's house, yet this fact was not
deemed prejudicial to the defendant's case or something the court should
have warned the jury to disregard or treat cautiously."8 And in State v. Lee,
defendant unsuccessfully sought to exclude his statement to the police as he
was resisting arrest;1 89 the police testified that the defendant "informed

184 id
185 id
186 A curious case is State v. Townes, 522 S.W.2d 22, 24 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1974), in which a

defendant asked, over his counsel's disagreement, to voir dire the jury on whether their decision
would be affected by the fact that he was a Muslim and thought that white people were devils.
After some discussion with the court, Townes told the prospective jurors, "I'm saying that you are
[devils]. I would like to know if there is anyone here that believes he is not a Devil." Id. While the
court attempted to make him sit down, the defendant and the jurors got into an interesting colloquy
about whether they had raised their hands to agree that they were devils, and apparently whether
they could be fair to his case if they were essentially agreeing that they were devils. Id. at 24-25.
1 Shamsid-Deen, 379 S.E.2d at 850.
1 State v. Brooks, 566 P.2d 147, 148 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977). This affiliation was particularly
damning because, in this death penalty case, the allegation was that Brooks was following orders
of his Nation of Islam minister, who allegedly kidnapped and robbed two girls, forced them to
disrobe, drove them out of town, and shot them as they were following orders to walk into the
woods. Id. at 147. Brooks also objected to the prosecution's attempt to paint him as a liar,
apparently to shore up the credibility of one of the survivors who suggested that Brooks was the
shooter. Id. at 148.
18 State v. Lee, 440 P.2d 562, 564-65 (Kan. 1968).
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[them] he was going to have [their] jobs, as he was a member of the
Black Muslims, and his people would not let [them] put him under arrest,
and he demanded to leave the scene, and kept informing [them] that [they]
were all going to lose [their] jobs."190
In State v. Smith, dissenting Justice Lundberg Stratton similarly
implied that the defendant brought prejudice on himself by wearing a prayer
cap during trial and testifying to issues regarding Islam during the
mitigation phase of the trial."' Defendant testified that he had foresworn
the violent aspects of the Nation of Islam highlighted in the movie
"Malcolm X." 192 Even so, Justice Lundberg Stratton understood the
consequences of making this connection for the jury, and would have
reversed on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel's
failure to prevent this kind of testimony.193 She reasoned that:
charged and
involving highly
topics,
[T]hese
could evoke
issues,
religious
and
controversial racial
strong emotional reactions in a jury. . . . Some
people believe, rightly or wrongly, that the tenets of the
Nation of Islam urge militant violence, a powerful image
that could have infected the jury's deliberation. Without a
careful rooting out of any potential juror who harbored
prejudicial racial or religious views, or who had formed
preconceived prejudices about either of the movies or the
Islamic movement, there is no way to be sure that
the jurors who deliberated were truly fair and impartial.194
Some Muslims have attempted to introduce evidence of their faith to
suggest that they have turned over a new leaf and no longer are the violent
criminals they used to be. Some courts have permitted such evidence. In
Smith, dissenting Justice Lundberg Stratton dismissively suggested that
"defense counsel's tactic of eliciting his religious testimony was an attempt
to evoke the sympathy of the jurors by showing that defendant's religious

190 Id. at 564. The Court in Wilson v. State, 459 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Mo. 1970) seemed similarly
unconcerned about admitting evidence in a rape case that the person committing the crime
"bragged about being a black Muslim," perhaps because the accused pled guilty to the rape.
191 See State v. Smith, 731 N.E.2d 645, 661 (Ohio 2000) (Lundberg Stratton, J., dissenting)
("Throughout the trial and mitigation phase, the defendant, a follower of the Islamic faith, wore a
prayer cap. Counsel attempted to make the jury aware that defendant no longer subscribed to the
ideology of the Nation of Islam movement [described earlier as a "hatred doctrine of blacks being
Gods and whites being devils"] . . .but rather the peaceful tenets of the Islamic religion.").
192 Id. (Lundberg Stratton, J., dissenting).
193 Id. at 662 (Lundberg Stratton, J., dissenting).
194 Id. (Lundberg Stratton, J., dissenting).
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conversion made him a gentler, more peaceful man today."' 95
However, in Commonwealth v. Reid, a 20-year-old murder defendant
in the death penalty phase of his trial was prohibited from introducing
evidence that he had left the gang he had been working with at the time of
the drug-related murder, converted to Islam, and become a different
person.' 9 6 The trial court believed that this would violate a state rule
prohibiting the introduction of religious beliefs or opinions, and might in
fact prejudice the jury against the defendant instead of for him.' 97 Even
though the appellate court disagreed with the trial court's conclusion on the
impermissibility of the evidence, the appellate court concluded that the
defendant was not prejudiced by the failure to introduce the evidence.' 98
Indeed, at least one appellate court found that the sentencing judge's
willingness to consider defendant's attempts to reform himself by becoming
a Muslim, albeit not sufficient to keep him out of jail, was proof of the
judge's willingness to considering lenity for the defendant. In
Commonwealth v. Black, which involved an armed robbery, the appellate
court decided:
We believe the record amply demonstrates that [the
sentencing judge] did take all these factors into account; in
addition, the judge considered appellant's recent
embracement of the Moslem faith, and the salubrious
effect this could be expected to work on appellant's
rehabilitation. However, [the sentencing judge] was more
impressed with the violent and precarious nature of the
crime committed.' 99
The defendant's decision to emphasize the positives in religious
conversion has sometimes backfired, however, because it can encourage the
jury to think that any misstep away from the defendant's religion suggests
that the defendant is either insincere about religious faith or is lying about
religious conversion. For example, in Imani v. Commonwealth, a defendant
attempted to refute a claim of drug dealing by noting that his religion, Islam,

195 Id. at 661 (Lundberg Stratton, J., dissenting).
96 Commonwealth v. Reid, 642 A.2d 453, 459 (Pa. 1994).
197 id
198 Id. at 461. See also Hassan v. State, 500 S.E.2d 644, 645-46 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998), in which a
defendant attempted to impeach the government witness who accused him of cursing by saying
that he did not curse, "that he was a Muslim, that he had never been convicted of a felony, and
that he had a good reputation in the community." Defendant alleged that his counsel was
ineffective by introducing this character evidence, because it was rebutted by an officer who heard
him curse in a different situation. Id. at 645.
199 Commonwealth v. Black, 467 A.2d 884, 885 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
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prohibited drug use. 2 m The prosecutor them impeached him by showing that
he had been convicted of not only drug crimes but also auto tampering and
interference with a police officer while he was a practicing Muslim.20 1
Some courts have also been unsympathetic to defense counsel's
attempts to play "the Muslim card." In People v. Fenner, the court held that
there were no grounds for the defendant to appeal his attorney's decision to
emphasize the Muslim garb that defendant was wearing to court as evidence
that a witness' identification of him was mistaken (presumably because the
perpetrator wore different clothes).2 02
Conversely, at least one defendant attempted to influence the jury
againstMuslims in order to mount a defense. In People v. Brisbon, a capital
murder case, defendant claimed ineffective assistance of counsel and jury
prejudice because his counsel failed to introduce sufficient evidence that the
Nation of Islam had brainwashed him to hate white people as an explanation
for the homicide. 20 3 One of his character witnesses testified that "the [Nation
of Islam] school that she and the defendant attended taught that the 'white
man was the devil, and the black man was the leader"' and that "[i]f a Nation
of Islam man murdered two white men . . . he would receive an honor

pendant to wear upon his lapel." 204 His claim was unsuccessful because of
200 Imani v. Commonwealth, No. 0280-92-2, 1993 WL 173690, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. May 25,
1993).
201 Id. As the appellate court determined, while the prior drug offense certainly might have
impeached his own testimony that as a Muslim he would not engage in drug dealing, the two other
charges were not salient to the drug crime he was charged with. Id. See also State v. Roche, 878
P.2d 497, 499 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994), where one defense attorney attempted to shore up the
defense witness's credibility on a statement that he had never used cocaine with co-defendant
Roche by having him testify that this use was contrary to his Muslim religion; State v. Johnson,
No. 34287, 1975 WL 183023, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 11, 1975), in which defendant attempted
to place blame for high school drug sales on someone else, claiming that defendant was a Sunni
Muslim and thus opposed the use of drugs and alcohol.
202 People v. Fenner, 551 N.Y.S.2d 305, 307 (App. Div. 1990); see also State v. Rahman, No.
CA-2210, 1984 WL 7547, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1984), rev'don othergrounds, 492 N.E.2d
401 (Ohio 1986), in which the appellate court refused to overturn a conviction on the basis of the
prosecutor's comments on the appellant's religion, noting:
Appellant was the first to raise the issue of his religion, his employment, and
his character. He did this during his direct examination. Also, in the final
argument, counsel for appellant was the first one to raise religion. The
prosecutor certainly had a right to respond ... : "Here's a man that he testified
is different from all of us anyway in the fact that he's black and different
from a lot of blacks because he both attempted to understand the religion
of Islam and the Bahai faith."
203 People v. Brisbon, 647 N.E.2d 935, 939-40 (Ill. 1995).
204 Id. at 940. Defendant introduced a physician's affidavit that "defendant's exposure to those
beliefs as a child was akin to child abuse and could potentially warp an individual's development.
He had also been informed that the defendant had received two or three serious head
injuries during his formative years. [The physician] opined that an individual who has
suffered head trauma may have organic brain damage that could affect his cognitive and affective
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the introduction of the character witnesses; the court held that "any further
testimony in this regard would have been cumulative."2 05 The court also
held that the defendant was not poorly represented due to the attorney's
failure to object trial court instructions that the jury could not consider the
defendant's race or religion in mitigation of his crime for death penalty
purposes.2 06
E. THE RELEVANCE OF A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S MUSLIM FAITH TO TIHE
UNDERLYING CRIME

One of the questions that arises in many criminal cases involving
Muslims is why the judges involved believe and feel the need to mention
that the defendant's or witness's faith is relevant to the crime the defendant
is charged with. It is also somewhat of a mystery that judges do not seem
conscious of the fact that simply mentioning the defendant's faith might
influence how people perceive the case.207 In Trammell v. State, for
functioning. Therefore, the defendant may be more susceptible to religious indoctrination." Id. at
941. The court held that the defense counsel's failure to follow up on this affidavit was not
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.
205 Id

Id. at 943-44. In Robinson v. State, 335 So.2d 420, 421 (Ala. Crim. Ct. 1976), a defendant
similarly attempted to mitigate his involvement in a riot by claiming that he had been indoctrinated
by the Muslims he was living with into the belief that he needed to be armed to defend himself.
He claimed that the homeowner, Arthur X, "taught them that God would come to judge the people
and that people would be fighting and dying; that he had people he could contact who would
support or fight for him; that he had enemies and they could not be trusted and that he had rather
see his enemies [mostly white people] dead." Id. He also counseled his group that when they wefit
downtown to take donations for a NOL hospital and school that "'if anyone hassled us about it,
we were to fight them,' [and] that his instructions about fighting were 'to disable someone and to
maim them."' Id.
207 Other cases in which the fact of a defendant's Islamic commitments were mentioned without
apparent relevance to the underlying crime include State v. Aqu-Simmons, No. 70035, 1997 WL
209166, at *11 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 24, 1994) (in an aggravated murder case, the court brushed
off a number of references to Islam: "The testimony about Simmons' marijuana use does not
include a statement that he was "'not a good Muslim.' . . . Officer Farid Allah Alim testified that,
when he arrived at the mosque on E. 99th street, Simmons was up against the wall and surrounded
by five Muslims. However, he did not describe them as 'vigilantes.' Alim did attempt to present
hearsay testimony that the men said Simmons killed a Muslim . . .") (internal citations omitted);
Hayes v. State, 449 S.E.2d 663, 665 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (where the court describes the contents
of a backpack carried by one of the car burglars as "tapes, a Koran, and three screwdrivers . . .");
State v. Pratt, 544 A.2d 392, 394 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (in which a witness explained
at trial that the 15-year-old defendant's comment that he was going to "serve" someone with a gun
"was a Muslim expression meaning that the person 'served' would 'not survive the day."'); Parris
v. State, 421 S.E.2d 137, 138 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (in which a confidential informant identifying
a suspect driving a Pontiac Grand Prix described him as "a Muslim looking fellow with [a]
physically deformed forehead.") (internal quotations omitted); Clark v. United States, 412 A.2d
21, 23 (D.C. 1980) (in which a witness described a suspect in a struggle as having "that very clean
Muslim look") (internal quotations omitted); State v. Gross, 577 A.2d 814, 816 (N.J. 1990) (in
206
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example, involving an armed robbery that occurred during a purported
door-to-door canvas by the defendants, the court noted that the defendants
purported to be "giving out literature having to do with the organization
commonly known as the Black Muslims and accepting whatever
contributions which might be made to this cause." 208 The robbery occurred
after the victim offered to pay fifty cents for the literature.2 09 It is not clear
that it was important for the appellate court to mention that this canvas was
for "the Black Muslims."2 10 In other words, it is unclear whether the court
was simply trying to tell a full story, or whether the appellate judges
believed that the defendants' fraud was particularly devious or threatening
because it was an attempt to solicit for a Muslim organization.
Commonwealth v. Adams2 1 1 poses a similar ambiguity. In that case, the
defendant was an abusive African-American husband who killed his
estranged Caucasian wife's parents, with whom she was living.2 12 The
appellate court felt compelled twice to mention that the defendant was a
Muslim-once in discussing his conversion and once his name change to
Iknaton Rhajik lksmala Nzaddi-meanwhile refuting the notion that race or
religion were inappropriate issues to introduce into the trial.213 The court

which the court described a robbery in a "Muslim pork-free sandwich shop,"); State v. Hatten,
561 S.W.2d 706, 710 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (in which the defendant's presence in a Cadillac was
explained by the fact that he and the car owner "were engaged . . . in selling Black Muslim
newspapers in the Kansas City area."); Woods v. State, 160 S.E.2d 922, 924 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968)
(involving a racial discrimination challenge to the grand and traverse juries in defendant's case,
in which the court describes the appellants as "Negroes and adherents of the Black Muslim or
Islam faith.").
208 Trammell v. State, 283 So.2d 620, 621 (Ala. Crim. App. 1973).
209 id
210 See id.

211 Commonwealth v. Adams, 753 N.E. 105 (Mass. 2001).
212 Id. at 108-109.

213 Id. at 108, 114. The court ultimately held:
The subjects of Adams's race and his religion were not irrelevant to the
issues at trial. A review of the record reveals that both parties referred to
them many times. Indeed, the defense put Adams's race, his religious
beliefs, and his concerns about prejudice against him before the jury in its
opening statement, and introduced extensive evidence on these issues
throughout the trial, as important background for his insanity defense. In this
context, questions by the prosecution about Adam's race and, to a lesser
extent, his religious activities were not inappropriate. They were advanced
to provide a more complete and balanced picture of Adams and his conduct,
and not to inflame juror prejudice. It was precisely because Adams's race
and religion were inevitably going to emerge as issues at trial-at a
of the murders
minimum because of the interracial nature
and Adams's marriage-that the judge conducted an intensive and
meticulous four-day jury selection process.
Id. at 114-15.
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then repeated Adams' new Muslim name, but said that it was nonetheless
going to use his original name because "[a]s is our custom we recite the
defendant's name as it first appears on the indictments." 2 14 It is hard not to
wonder why the court itself felt the need to stress the race and religion of
this defendant.
In Perry v. State, in which the issue was the identity of the rapist of a
mentally disabled teenager, the trial court questioned the witness and
allowed testimony that the victim's "family is from Iran and they
are Moslem. She is not allowed to date or talk to boys on the telephone."2 15
The court nowhere links this allusion to any aspect of the crime, but the
reference does appear to reinforce the stereotype of the deeply shrouded and
confined Muslim woman.
In People v. Howk, the court permitted the defendant's faith and his
terrorist-like comments to be introduced in a domestic homicide case.216
Howk was charged with murdering his girlfriend Sonja after a lengthy
abusive relationship in which he threatened several times to kill her,
threatened suicide, or threatened apparent rival suitors.2 17 Both the
prosecutor and the defense introduced evidence as to the defendant's
religious beliefs.2 18 The prosecution described his conversion to Islam,
Sonja's interest in him because of their common interest in Islamic history
and philosophy, and her criticism of him for violating tenets of his religion,
such as bans against smoking and drinking.2 19 In the penalty phase, the
prosecution was also allowed to produce diary entries which detailed the
defendant's rage against "enemies of Allah":
I have been in a rage for several years now, and my temper
is growing shorter. I frequently feel like brutalizing every
infidel with whom I have the misfortune to come into
contact. May Allah destroy the enemies of Islam! May
Allah make us, his faithful slaves, the instrument with
which he anihilates [sic] the enemies of the faith! ...

I want

to kill. I don't care whom I kill as long as I can kill someone
who is an enemy of my God.220
These entries in Howk's diaries made no mention of killing Sonja; in
fact, one suggested that he might be calmed down by Sonja from his desire
2 14

Id. at 108 n.1.
215 Perry v. State, 776 So.2d 1102, 1103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
216 People v. Howk, 365 P.2d 426,428-29 (Cal. 1972).
217 Id. at 428.
2 18

1 d at 430.

2191d at 428.
220 Id at 430 (internal quotations omitted).
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to kill. 221 The trial court permitted these entries, despite the fact that there
were a number of statements he made about his urge to kill that did not
mention Islam. 222 It is not clear why the trial court believed that these entries
were relevant to his obsession with his girlfriend, or why the court did not
exclude these entries as prejudicial to his case.
Of course, the defense counsel in this case also attempted to
rehabilitate the defendant by introducing evidence that he "was active in
the Moslem church in San Francisco, that he gave talks on religious subjects
there, and conducted a Sunday school class for small children." 223 It may be
that the defense attorney felt compelled to try to counteract this picture of
the defendant as a Muslim terrorist, but this leaves open the question of
whether the jury should have heard any evidence relevant to his faith or his
threats to kill infidels.
Another case involving a forcible rape, in which the mention of the
defendant's religion seems gratuitous, is State v. Elyel.2 2 4 In this case, the
defendant allegedly got into the victim's apartment by engaging her in a
religious conversation. 225 The appellate court reported their first encounter
as follows:
The victim, one Cassandra Nichols, described as a four
foot, ten inch black woman in her early 20's, and an
adherent of the Jehovah Witness sect, initially met the
defendant, a 23 year old black Muslim, at a bus stop where
both were waiting for and ultimately took the same bus.
Ms. Nichols, according to her testimony, engaged in casual
conversation with the defendant, sufficient, in any event, to
identify one another's religious affiliations, and Ms.
Nichol's [sic] address.226
Defendant came to the victim's apartment a few nights later, and the
court went on, "[a]fter preliminaries, they began to discuss their religious
beliefs, Ms. Nichols securing a bible for each. This discussion continued for
about one hour until the defendant mentioned that he had been in a gang
and had raped four women." 2 27

221 See id. ("[The defendant] expressed the hope that he would meet Sonja the next day because
she was gentle and would quiet him.").
222 id
223

Id
224 State v. Elyel, No. C-830403, 1984 WL 14107, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 21, 1984).
225 Id. at *5.

226 Id. (internal citations omitted).
227 id
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This conversation was followed by the rape.228 Since no further
mention of either person's religious tradition occurs in the narrative, it is
not clear why the religious affiliations of both defendant and victims were
established: was it to paint the victim, a Jehovah's Witness, as essentially
good and trusting, or the defendant as especially cunning in using the
victim's interest in proselytizing him as a Muslim as a basis for gaining her
trust? Even if the court's sole purpose was to simply flesh out the details of
the story, once again, the court's report of the case paints "the Black
Muslim" as a violent and untrustworthy character.
Another good example of gratuitous discussion of the defendant's
religion is Commonwealth v. Riggins, a case from Philadelphia, which has
a sizeable Muslim population.229 In Riggins, the court allowed evidence
that defendants were Muslims apparently just because the victim, in a dying
declaration, accused her assailants of being Muslims. 230 Despite defendant's
claim that both his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to
object to "the element of racial prejudice" in the trial, the court cited to other
cases where a defendant identification as "Muslim" was permitted and
noted that "the appellant's being a Muslim was a relevant fact in view of
the victim's dying declaration," even though that would not seem to narrow
the universe of defendants very much at all."2 3 1
Perhaps cases that might better justify the relevance of religious
information are those in which prosecutors used defendants' statements to
establish their motive for the crime. One such case to consider is State v.
Marshall, involving a handgun assault by one friend against another after
they quarreled.23 2 The apparent subject of the quarrel was the defendant's
attempt to engage the victim in a conversation about Black Muslims. 233

228Id

229 Philadelphia has been known as "Muslim Town" for its thriving Muslim
culture, which
suggests that "being Muslim" does not narrow the list of suspects very precisely, so it is not clear
why the court found this to be a relevant identifying fact. Abigail Hauslohner, 'Muslim Town': A
Look Inside Philadelphia's Thriving Muslim Culture, WASH. POST (July 21, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/07/21/muslim-town-how-oneamerican-city-embraced-a-muslim-community-indecline/?noredirect-on&utm term=.22e62808c7e6.
230 Commonwealth v. Riggins, 542 A.2d 1004, 1007 (1988).
231 Id. The two citations provide at best minimal support for the evidentiary decision:
the court
cites "Commonwealth v. Rainey, 412 A.2d 1106, 1108-1109 ([Pa. Super. Ct.] 1979) (police
officer's testimony concerning witness' reference to a Muslim meeting was proper since it
concerned a legitimate response to a valid question asked by police during their
investigation); Commonwealth v. Griffin, 412 A.2d 897, 902 ([Pa. Super. Ct.] 1979) (references
to the Muslim religion were properly admitted to demonstrate existence of strong common bond
among appellant, his co-defendants, decedent and witnesses)." Id. (parallel citations omitted).
232 State v. Marshall, 168 S.E.2d 487, 488 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969).
233 id
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According to the case report, when the victim replied that "he was not
interested in that subject," he was called outside by the defendant and
shot.2 34 While the evidence might be relevant to show how the quarrel
started, thereby establishing the level of mens rea or defenses that the
defendant might have, the court sheds little light on why a conversation
about Black Muslims would result in an almost deadly quarrel or why it was
important to explain that the unwanted conversation was about Black
Muslims at all.
Even when a defendant's motive is connected to Islam, there appears
to be no apparent attempt by courts to refute or question defendants' own
sometimes outrageous claims about what Islamic law actually permits. In
People v. Strong, a stabbing homicide involving a "Sudan Muslim['s]"
attempt to demonstrate the power of mind over matter (a religious tenet of
his Muslim sect), the defendant attempted to introduce evidence that he had
successfully stopped several believers' hearts and plunged knives into their
chests without ill effect.235 In State v. Townsend, the prosecutor successfully
used a defendant's post-arrest admission to shooting the victim "because
the victim had insulted the defendant's wife. The defendant stated that he
was a Muslim, and Muslim law permitted him to kill any person who
insulted his wife." 236 In People v. Green, an inebriated defendant was
charged with murder and attempted murder for shooting two men with
whom he was drinking beer. 237 The court opined that his apparent motive
was his confession that the three of them had misappropriated funds "which
had been donated by area numbers runners to upgrade the community
centers used by the Muslim sect of which they were members."2 38 Again,
since it is difficult to understand how the beneficiary of their
misappropriation is relevant to the defendant's outrage, it is also hard to
understand why the court felt the need to mention it.
F. FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS BY MUSLIMS IN CRIMINAL CASES
In some criminal cases, defendants mounted substantive First
Amendment claims or defenses relating to their faith. Some of these cases
recognized a Free Exercise claim for a Muslim to wear religious attire in
court. In In re Palmer,a trial court's ejection of a Muslim requesting a name
change because he refused to take off his takia, or prayer cap, was

234

Id

235 People v. Strong, 338 N.E.2d 602, 604 (N.Y. 1975).
236 State v. Townsend, 558 A.2d 669, 670 (Conn. 1989).
237 People v. Green, 430 N.Y.S. 2d 150, 151 (App. Div. 1980).
238

id.
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overturned on Free Exercise grounds. 239 The court applied the Sherbert v.
Verner test, 24 0 which required the trial judge to demonstrate that the prayer
cap would harm the decorum of the proceedings. 2 41 The Palmer court cited
McMillan v. State, where a defendant who refused to remove his prayer cap
in court was cited for criminal contempt; 2 42 the McMillan court overturned

the contempt conviction based on the trial court's failure to apply the
Sherbert analysis before punishing the defendant.2 43
In other cases, however, courts made short shrift of procedural claims
or defenses by witnesses that were ostensibly based on their faith, foregoing
any First Amendment analysis of whether they were entitled to exemptions.
This is especially notable since most of these cases arose between Sherbert
v. Verner and Employment Division v. Smith,2 " when any law that
substantially burdened an individual's free exercise of religion received
strict scrutiny.245
Other challenges to courtroom procedures based on defendants' claims
about their duties under Islamic law have similarly been rejected without
any significant Free Exercise analysis. 246 In State v. Bing, a Muslim witness
was convicted of contempt of court for refusing to testify against a member
of his religion. 2 47 The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected his appeal
without any Free Exercise analysis, noting that his religious beliefs did not
relieve him of his responsibility as a citizen to testify. 24 8 In State v. Casteel,
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected a defendant's argument that his
swearing-in violated his Free Exercise rights because it was not

2 39

In re Palmer, 386 A.2d 1112, 1113-14 (R.I. 1978).

240 See supra note 179.

241 Palmer, 386 A.2d at 1115-16.
242 Id. (citing McMillan v. State, 265 A.2d 453 (Md. 1970)).
243 McMillan, 265 A.2d at 455-46. Palmer and McMillan were cited in State v. Hodges, 695
S.W.2d 171, 171-72 (Tenn. 1985), in which the defendant came to court dressed up like a chicken,
which he claimed was his spiritual attire. Although the court was unsympathetic towards his claim,
it held that the defendant should have been given the chance to develop a record on this point
before being charged with contempt. Id. at 173-74.
244 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
245 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
246 See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 497 N.Y.S.2d 539, 539 (App. Div. 1985), a second-degree murder
case involving a man who stabbed his wife to death. The defendant attempted to quash grand jury
subpoenas to members of his mosque, arguing the priest-penitent privilege. Id. While the court
acknowledged the possibility of privilege for conversations "between a Muslim brother acting as
a spiritual advisor," the court held that the defendant's mosque interrogation was initiated by
mosque members to determine whether defendant was dangerous and needed to be removed,
rather than for the purpose of giving "religious counsel, advice, solace, absolution or ministration."
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
247 State v. Bing, 253 S.E.2d 101, 102 (S.C. 1979).
248 id
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administered by a Muslim cleric chosen by him. 2 49 Ignoring the claim that
the defendant was forced to violate his beliefs, the court held that the trial
court had complied with statutory requirements regarding oaths and
affirmations.250
A substantive religious freedom defense was used in a trespass case in
Darab v. United States, in which a religious leader and his followers were
arrested for trespass after interrupting a rival Muslim worship service at an
Islamic Center, at which they claimed to have the right to be present.2 51 The
ousted leader based his claim of right on a fatwa252 obtained from Al-Azhar
University in Cairo, where the most authoritative interpreters of Islamic law
sat.25 Noting that this fatwa held that no person or group owned or had the
right to control admission to the Islamic Center or prayers in it, the rival
cleric remarked: "My belief was that the services . . . the prayer services at

the Islamic Center and the Islamic Center, itself, was a place of worship for
all Muslims. And that no one, no group of people whatever their
characterization might be, had the right to interfere in the religious services
designated for this place of worship . . "254
In Darab,the court invoked Employment Division v. Smith255 and even
Reynolds v. United States25 6 to reject appellants' claim that under the Free
Exercise Clause, the charges against them required the jury to make Islamic

249 State v. Casteel, No. 85-2248-CR, 1987 WL 267457, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 1987).
250 Id.
251 Darab v. United States, 623 A.2d 127, 129-31 (D.C. 1993). A similar incident arose in a civil
case. In Masjid Al-Ihsaan Inc. v. Ouda, 553 S.E.2d 331, 332 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) one of the trustees
of a mosque ousted a fifth trustee, and then had him arrested for criminal trespass after he
attempted to form a rival corporation. Because he kept leading prayers and proselytizing (allegedly
in violation of the Holy Quran and the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed) on the property of
the Masjid Al-Ihsaan, the first board filed a civil case to enjoin any further trespass. Id. The
mosque also attempted to restrain two other members who were leading prayers, proselytizing and
bringing weapons onto the premises. Id. at 332-33.
252 A fatwa is "an Islamic legal pronouncement, issued by an expert in religious law ... pertaining
to a specific issue, usually at the request ofan individual or judge to resolve an issue where Islamic
jurisprudence . . . is unclear." What is a Fatwa?, ISLAMIC SUPREME COUNCIL AM.,
http://www.islamicsupremecouncil.org/understanding-islam/legal-rulings/44-what-is-afatwa.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2019). According to the defendant in Darab, "fatwas are
considered the cornerstone . . . the opinionating quarters of the Muslim world. In other words, if
there were an equivalent in Islam to a Vatican . .. that would be it." Darab, 623 A.2d at 132 n.17.
253 Darab, 623 A.2d at 132.
254 Id.
255 Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990) (holding that employees who were
terminated from their jobs for ingesting a drug as part of a religious ritual were not, under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, exempt from a state law banning the use of that drug).
256 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (holding that Mormons whose sincere
religious beliefs led them to practice polygamy were not exempt from statutes banning the
practice).
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law judgments about who owned the mosque. 257 As the court explained, the
trespass statute was a "neutral and generally applicable law" that regulated
conduct only, not belief.258 The "unlawful" requirement of the statute was
based on evidence about "a deed to the property, evidence of a disturbance,
and evidence of defenses," and the jury was "asked to determine whether a
crime had occurred, not to choose sides." 259 The arrested cleric and his
followers could not prevail simply by reciting their belief in the fatwa and
Koran without showing that their belief in their right to stay was
"reasonable," as evidence that they were aware that there was a request to
leave overcame their bona fide belief that they were entitled to stay. 26 0
G. CULTURAL DEFENSES
In some cases involving purported religious beliefs, the relationship
between religion and culture is so intertwined that it is difficult to
distinguish these claims. Nevertheless, in the few cases in which immigrant
defendants made claims grounded more in culture than in theology, the
defendants lost.
In State v. Haque, the defendant unsuccessfully attempted to get an
adequate provocation manslaughter instruction for the killing of his former
girlfriend on the basis of his cultural expectations about their relationship,
which was finally terminated by the girlfriend. 26 1He unsuccessfully tried to
introduce evidence by a cultural anthropologist, who claimed that according
to the defendant's traditional Muslim Indian upbringing, intimate
relationships were expected to last for life, and the pattern of dating and "on
again off again quality of their relationship," coupled with his immigrant
experience, would have been "extremely difficult [for the defendant] to
manage." 262
A Virginia court similarly rejected a Somali man's attempted cultural
defense that his smuggling of khat into the United States was not illegal
because he lacked mens rea for the crime. 263 The defendant claimed that
smoking khat was an expected custom at Somali weddings, where he was
headed, and that it was often used by Muslims to stay up late to read the
Koran, though there was some evidence that he might have been aware that

257 Darab, 623 A.2d at 132-33.

258

Id at 133.
259 Id at 134.
260 Id at 135-38.

261 State v. Haque, 726 A.2d 205, 206-209 (Me. 1999).
262 Id at 207.

263 Commonwealth v. Siad, No. CRIM 9463, 1997 WL 33421320, at *2-*3 (Va. Cir.
Ct. Mar. 6,
1997).
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some states prohibited khat.264
To summarize, American criminal cases involving Muslims often
repeated the stereotype of Muslims, particularly "Black Muslims," as
untrustworthy, not credible, sometimes subversive and ultimately
threatening violence to the larger community, as well as oppressors of
women. These references were particularly dramatic in prosecutorial
attempts to influence juries, but transcript references suggested that not only
juries, but also judges, prosecutors, and even defense counsel harbored
stereotypes about Muslims. Courts also struggled with questions of
improper jury prejudice in cases where Muslims wore distinctive clothing,
asked for time off for Friday prayers, or asked to be sworn in on the Qur'an.
Some defendants referred to their faith as a means of suggesting that they
were unlikely to have committed the alleged crimes or that they had
reformed, which courts did not hold to have prejudicial effect. Still other
defendants seemed to understand that decisionmakers held prejudices about
Islam, sometimes attempting to distance themselves from Islam or blaming
pressure from Muslim brothers for their crimes. In many cases, courts
allowed references to defendants' faith that seem irrelevant to guilt or
innocence. And finally, Muslims were successful in a few cases, but
unsuccessful in many others, in raising First Amendment religious defenses
or cultural defenses to their crimes.
III. FAMILY LAW CASES
In significant contrast to the criminal law cases decided between 1960
and 2001, most of the family law court cases involving Muslims or Islamic
law generally suggest that courts earnestly attempted to respect the different
cultural beliefs of Muslims and the laws of the countries from which they
came. However, occasional court biases did come through. In general, there
seemed to be fewer conflicts between courts and litigants regarding the
fairness of procedures in family law cases, but more disagreements over the
law to be applied or the facts.265

264 Id. However, because the statute under which he was prosecuted banned only the active
hallucinogenic ingredient in khat and not khat itself, the court overturned his conviction based on
the state's failure to prove that the defendant's action was illegal. Id. at *4.
265 But see Shike v. Shike, No. 14-97-00888-CV, 2000 WL 490696, at *1-*2 (Tex. App. Apr. 27,
2000). Although the trial judge made an inappropriate comment about a Pakistani adoption
document introduced at trial, the appellate court concluded that the defendant's own behavior and
comments were much more damaging than the judge's comment. For example, the defendant's
wife introduced evidence
that Mr. Shike wanted to videotape the proceedings so he could send the
tape to Pakistan to have an Islamic death warrant issued against Mrs.
Shike. He considered the issuance of such a warrant appropriate since he
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The most common disputes involving Muslims were custody battles
involving either parents from other countries or parents who converted to
Islam. Often, these disputes arose because a Muslim parent and a nonMuslim parent disagreed about the child's upbringing in the Muslim faith
or a foreign culture.26 6 Another common dispute arose over the question of
whether Islamic marriages and talaq divorces (effected by the husband
stating "I divorce you" three times) were valid for purposes such as second
marriages.2 67
Very few courts in these divorce and custody cases attempted to make
a lengthy description of the requirements of Islamic law. One exception is
In re Marriageof Shaban, in which a California court rejected a husband's
attempt to use terms in a marriage contract referring to Islamic law's
understanding of separate property in order to avoid California's
community property regime.268 In a footnote, the Shaban court went into an
unusually extended discussion explaining the complexity of Islamic law:
Indeed, even the term "Islamic law" is relatively uncertain.
There are at least four schools of interpretation of Islamic
law: the Shafi'i, Hanafi, Maliki, and Hanbali. The legal
system in various Islamic countries will often be influenced
by one school or the other. Egypt, for example, has been
influenced by both the Hanafi and Maliki schools. Indeed,
one commentator has observed that England has rejected
any attempt to give effect to Islamic "personal law"
because of the varieties of competing schools
within Islam ... Here, not only would the expert have had

was a Muslim. He refused to refrain from making side-bar comments
despite the courts [sic] instructions and admonitions. He repeatedly
violated court orders and criticized opposing counsel, other witnesses, and
Mrs. Shike. He misrepresented the truth in several instances during the
trial. The evidence also showed that he stalked his wife, threatened to
kidnap her children, assaulted her, and assaulted her son.
Id. at *2.
266 See, e.g., Sidi M.C. v. Bouchra T., No. CN95-09295, 1998 WL 665518, at *1 (Del. Fam. Ct.
May 15, 1998), in which a well-educated father in a custody dispute claimed that an uneducated
mother "has failed to teach Sami anything about the Muslim or Arabian cultures" and felt
"strongly that his son should learn about the Arabian culture, so that he can communicate with
Father's family when Father brings the child with him to Morocco."
267 See, e.g., Seth v. Seth, 694 S.W.2d 459,462-64 (Tex. App. 1985) (disregarding a talaq divorce
and applying American law instead to hold that a husband's first marriage was still valid); Maklad
v. Maklad, No. FA000443796S, 2001 WL 51662, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 2001) (refusing
to recognize a talaq divorce that was conducted in Connecticut and affirmed by an Egyptian court
due to defects in due process and consent).
268 In re Marriage of Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 865-68 (Ct. App. 2001) (discussing also the
purpose of a dowry in Islamic law).
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to opine, based primarily on one phrase in the document
and his own knowledge of Egyptian society and law in the
early 1970s, whether the parties agreed to have their
marriage governed by a school of doctrine disembodied
from any system of national law (general "Islamic law" as
distinct from codified Egyptian law or the law of some
other nation state), but if he concluded that it was the
former, he would have had to opine what particular school
of Islamic law was to govern the contract.2 69
A. CUSTODY DISPUTES
Common issues in custody disputes involving Muslims from 1960 to
2001 included concerns that one parent has fled or would flee to another
jurisdiction with the child where the other parent would not be able to
retrieve the child, 27 0 and conflicts over the religious and/or cultural
upbringing of the child.27 1 The courts in this period also dealt with problems
that come up in contemporary disputes of this nature regardless of the
parent's religious affiliation, such as the application of the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act ("UCCJA"),27 2 the "best interests" standard for
child custody problems with relocation of one parent,273 and alienation of
affections cases.274

269 Id. at 868 n.4 (internal citations omitted).
270 See, e.g., Al-Silham v. Al-Silham, No. 94-A-0048, 1995 WL 803808, at *1, *4-*5 (Ohio Ct.
App. Nov. 24, 1995), infra pp. 75-76; Marzouki v. Marzouki, No. 96-3604, 1997 WL 716133, at
*2-*3 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding a father's supervised visitation of his young child, whom
the mother feared he would abduct to his homeland in Tunisia, on the basis of factors other than
the feared abduction. However, the court noted that the trial court order in part "was made to
accommodate Elizabeth's anxiety regarding that risk. Reasonable accommodations to the wishes
of the sole legal custodian of the child are appropriate, particularly here where threats were made
against the custodial parent. Indeed, Jamel himself recognized the need to make Elizabeth feel
secure and he offered to surrender his passport and air travel tickets when exercising periods of
physical placement with the child.").
271 See, e.g., Arain v. Arain, 619 N.Y.S.2d 591, 591-92 (App. Div. 1994), in which a father sought
a change of custody, alleging that the mother had failed to bring her child up in the Muslim faith
as she agreed to in the divorce custody agreement. The court noted that courts will enforce
agreements regarding religious upbringing but held that there was no evidence in this case that the
mother had violated the agreement.
272 See infra note 284.
273 See infra note 284.

274 See infra p. 77; see also, e.g., Dincer v. Dincer, 701 A.2d 210, 214-15 (Pa. 1997) (applying
the UCCJA to divest Pennsylvania courts of jurisdiction in favor of Belgium, where the children
had the strongest contacts, despite concerns about the father's interest in returning them to Turkey
because the father had become a more observant Muslim, read to his children from the Koran, and
required the family to speak only Turkish and watch mostly Turkish television); Ali v. Ali, 652
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A complex example of a case at the intersection of concerns about
discrimination against Muslims and a possible "kidnapping" of a custodial
child is Al-Silham v. Al-Silham, involving a custody and visitation dispute
between a Saudi father and a Caucasian mother of a child who was in her
mother's custody from the ages of one to four.2 75 The father, tired of long
trips to see his daughter, attempted to lift the supervision of the visitation
granted to him.2 76 The mother objected because of her concern that the
father might kidnap their daughter and flee to Saudi Arabia, pointing out
that the father continued to be a Saudi citizen, was unemployed and
finishing a master's degree while his parents supported him, and had only
intermittent income from car sales.277
In Al-Silham, the mother substantiated her fears that her ex-husband
would abscond with the child through evidence that the father had
repeatedly threatened her with statements, such as that she would "lose her
baby and never see her again," that their daughter Layla "would either
be Muslim or she would be a whore," and that if "Layla was not
raised Muslim, she would be better off dead." 2 78 Awitness also testified that
the father told his daughter that he was taking her to see her grandparents in
Saudi Arabia and she should "[fjorget about [her] mommy." 2 79 The father

had also had passport photos taken of the child, who was designated to
travel on his passport; he had an open plane ticket to Saudi Arabia; and he
had access to large amounts of cash.280 The evidence also showed that the
father's divorced brother had absconded to Saudi Arabia with his child
during his divorce, and that the father had demonstrated disrespect for
American law enforcement.2 81 Ultimately, the court upheld the supervised
visitation, noting that "[a]ny parent, regardless of race or religion who had
exhibited the same behavior would undoubtedly be subjected to a similar
restriction of supervised visitation, at least until such concerns were
addressed to the satisfaction of the court." 28 2 However, the court restricted
the supervisor to one person to prevent the supervision from being "a barrier

A.2d 253, 257-59 (N.J. 1994) (declining to recognize a custody award from a Gazan court because
the father did not provide a decree with "best interest findings.").
275 Al-Silham 1995 WL 803808,
at *1.
276id

Id at *4.
id.
Id (also noting that he specifically told his daughter that they were going to see her grandfather
and
grandmother in another country).
2 80
id
281 id
282 id
277

278
2 79
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to a free exchange of love and affection between a parent and child." 2 8 3
In these custody disputes, most of the courts considering cases
involving Muslims appeared to apply the same legal principles they would
have applied in non-Muslim cases, such as under the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act ("UCCJA") and the best interests of the child
standard.284 For example, in Dincer v. Dincer, the court applied the
jurisdictional requirements of the UCCJA to surrender American
jurisdiction to other countries with stronger contacts to the children whose
custody was being contested.2 85 Conversely, in Tataragasiv. Tataragasi,
American courts refused to surrender jurisdiction where the contesting
jurisdiction failed to apply UCCJA standards, such as the best interests of
the child custody standard.286
In another case, Lazarevic v. Fogelquist, the court applied a fairly
standard relocation analysis 28 7 to determine that a divorced and remarried
mother could relocate her children to the Aramco compound in Saudi
Arabia, where she would work.2 88 The father objected to this relocation,
citing the possibility of harm to the children because of terrorism, the
283 Id at *4-*5.

284 See In re Custody of R., 947 P.2d 745 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997), which involved a Pakistani
custody dispute where the mother had custody under a Pakistani civil court judgment and the
father had custody under a later Sharia court judgment, after which the mother fled to the United
States. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act ("UCCJA"), adopted with some
modifications by all states, explains how jurisdiction for child custody should be determined when
two parents have obtained or are trying to obtain custody in different jurisdictions, whether
national or international. Id. at 752-53. The "best interests of the child" standard is contemplated
by the UCCJA and is the most common standard in the U.S. for determining custody in contests.
Id. As the court notes, some jurisdictions also expect foreign jurisdictions to apply the bestinterests standards in order to have their custody determinations respected. Id.
285 See Dincer v. Dincer, 791 A.2d 210, 213 (Pa. 1997) (applying the UCCJA to divest
Pennsylvania courts of jurisdiction in favor of Belgium, where the children had the strongest
contacts, despite concerns about the father's interest in returning them to Turkey, given evidence
that the father had become a more observant Muslim, who read to his children from the Koran,
and required the family to speak only Turkish and watch mostly Turkish television).
286 See Tataragasi v. Tataragasi, 477 S.E.2d 239, 246 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the
Turkish courts would not have jurisdiction over custody of children whose mother fled Turkey
because of the abuse the father inflicted on both them and their mother, and because the Turkish
court did not apply the best-interests standard required by the UCCJA but "instead talked about
defendant's position and status in the community, the importance of Islam, circumcision and
defendant's place in society."); see also Ali v. Ali, 652 A.2d 253, 257-58 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1994) (declining to recognize a custody award from a Gazan court because the father did not
provide a decree with "best interest findings"); In re Brennan, 134 N.W.2d 126, 131-32 (Minn.
1965) (applying Minnesota law to a custody dispute involving an unmarried Muslim father and
Christian mother who wished to place her child for adoption).
287 See, e.g., IRA ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 719-24 (5th ed. 2010)

(discussing various court approaches to motions to modify custody or visitation based on the
custodial parent's plan to relocate to a distant city).
288 Lazarevic v. Fogelquist, 668 N.Y.S.2d 320, 321-22 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
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uncertain quality of schools in the compound, and lack of intellectual
stimulation for the children.289 Although the mother won the right to
relocate to Saudi Arabia, 2 90 the court nevertheless permitted some
stereotyping about the Muslim culture by including a lengthy quote from
the Law Guardian's arguments:
Schools: This is simply one great big unknown. What are
the schools in the compound like? There has been no
evidence or testimony in admissible form to show what the
schools are like. What are the academic statistics, the
curriculum, etc.? Does the government imposed [sic]
censorship extend into the classrooms? Is the curriculum
regulated by what the government believes the children
should learn? Is particular emphasis on the Muslim culture
taught? Do the children learn about topics, places and
events which the Saudi Government might feel threatened
by such as Judaism, Israel, etc.29 1
Similarly, in Pathan v. Pathan,the court applied commonplace family
law rules from so-called "alienation of affections" cases involving parents
who try to poison the child's relationship with the other parent in order to
change custody2 92 from a non-Muslim mother to a Muslim father, who was
in this case a respected physician.2 93 The court noted as evidence that the
mother attempted to convert her daughter from Islam to Christianity and
that she used the threat of Muslim terrorism to make her afraid of her
father's family, such as by having her watch a TV show about a foreignborn father kidnapping his child from his American mother.294
American courts also applied traditional U.S. rules about removal of
children from their homes and termination of parental rights in cases
289 Id. at 324-26.
290 Id at 327-28.
291 Id. at 324 (emphasis added). While the court acknowledged that the children "may sacrifice
the more expansive freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of dress which would
otherwise be afforded to him here in America," and that they "will not have the pleasure of
participating in the many varied cultural activities available in New York City," the court notes
"that this fact is true for many Americans not living in or near a large metropolitan area-solely
because this kind of culture is not something that interests them or because they do not have the
means to travel and participate in these activities." Id at 326.
292 Though the court does not refer to these cases, the court's actions typify court behavior in these
alienation of affections cases. See, e.g., ELLMAN ET. AL, supra note 287, at 663-64 (discussing
courts' decisions to transfer custody due to the parent's attempts to alienate the child's affections
from the other parent, and "parental alienation syndrome.").
293 See Pathan v. Pathan, Nos. 18254, 96 OS 1, 2000 WL 129529, at *6 (Ohio
Ct. App. Sept. 15,
2000).
294 Id. at *5.
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involving Muslims. 2 9 5 For example, in In re A.B.E., the court refused to
terminate parental rights of a Muslim father who was charged with child
abuse and who placed his learning-disabled child in the foster care of his
mosque, where the child was allegedly "beaten with a belt buckle and
injured when an adult walked across his back." 29 6 Despite these facts, the
appellate court overturned the trial court's termination of the father's
parental rights because it could find no value in terminating parental rights
when there was no "substantial good" to be gained. 29 7 Similarly, in In re
Welfare of MA., the Minnesota Court of Appeals followed a common
pattern in terminating parental rights of a Muslim parent, requiring a
stringent standard of proof for the state: that "evidence relating to
termination must address conditions that exist at the time of the hearing,.
. and that it must appear that the present conditions of neglect will continue
for a prolonged, indeterminate period." 298 The court concluded that children
were properly removed from abusive Oromo Muslim parents after
"extensive services designed to rehabilitate this family, such as: a parenting
program, which included in-home instruction; a domestic abuse program;
individual therapy; an anger management program; and regular visits" with
the child, as well as help from the Oromo doctor who reported the child's
injuries and a supportive Oromo social worker. 299 Rejecting the parents'
argument that the state's standards "imposed 'white Anglo-Saxon
Christian' parenting skills on them," the court found that the case plan for
the family was "culturally appropriate" and suggested "that protecting and
taking care of one's small children is not a characteristic that any one race
or ethnic group claims for its own. Rather, taking care of one's children is
the universal culture of all parents."3 00
In other termination cases, the courts' analyses similarly proceed along
grounds similar to those that would likely be employed in cases not
involving Muslims. For example, in In re Custody of Sloan, the court
applied Virginia precedent, in line with many of these cases, to conclude
that there is a presumption in favor of awarding custody to the natural
parent, which can "only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence of
parental unfitness." 30 1The court terminated a Muslim father's custody after
See generally ELLMAN ET. AL, supranote 287, at 1212-23, 1268-75.
In re A.B.E., 564 A.2d 751, 753 (D.C. 1989).
297 Id. at 757-58.
298 See In re Welfare of M.A., No. CX-01-98, 2001 WL 881642, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App.
Aug. 7,
2001 (citing In re Welfare of Chosa, 290 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. 1980)).
299 Id. at *7.
30 Id at *7-*8.
301 See, e.g., In re Custody of Sloan, 1991 WL 11030250, at *2-*3 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 3, 1991); for
a discussion of typical standards for termination cases, see ELLMAN ET. AL, supra note 287, at
295

296
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a finding of unfitness based on his "lifestyle, attitude, behavior, instability,
living circumstances, personal habits, and emotional status" on facts that
included the father's kidnapping of the infant from her mother, putting her
with a foster family for over two years, taking her to a foreign country for
several months, and then returning her to the foster family.302 Perhaps the
only arguably prejudicial comment that reflected on the father's Muslim
faith was the court's view that Sloan's marriage to two and perhaps three
women, all of whom were residing with him, proved that he was immoral
and unfit for custody.303
Along the same lines, in In re Logan, a Nebraska court terminated the
parental rights of a mother who argued that she was rehabilitated because
she had converted to Islam as well as becoming employed, going to college
and completing drug counseling. 3" The court rejected her claim that she
had reformed, noting that at the very same time she did these things, "she
was arrested numerous times, convicted of two or more felonies, cohabited
with known criminals, was incarcerated in both Denver and Colorado
Spring" and received a suspended sentence for possessing narcotics. 05
Applying the statutory standard that "reasonable efforts, under the direction
of the court, have failed to correct conditions leading to the determination,"
the court ordered her rights terminated.30 6 Family law courts often tried to
respect the different views and circumstances of parties from other
countries.30 7 However, claims of religious or ethnic bias by Muslim
noncitizens were sometimes rejected by courts. For example, in Marzouki
v. Marzouki, the Wisconsin appellate court rejected a Muslim father's claim
that the trial court was biased against him in a visitation dispute because of
742-43 (noting that many states apply a presumption for the parent unless "the parent is shown to
be unfit or to have abandoned his or her rights.").
302 Custody ofSloan, 1991 WL 11030250, at *1-*2, *4.
303 Id. at *4.
304 See In re Logan, 281 N.W.2d 753, 754 (Neb. 1979).
305 Id.
306 Id. at 754-55. One unusual case, involving an adoption after a termination of rights that was

never completed, is Geramifar v. Geramifar, 688 A.2d 475 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997). An
adopting couple who sought to adopt a child from Iran (the husband's home country) sought a
divorce after they became guardians of an Iranian child placed with them for adoption. Id. at 478.
The adopting father abandoned his quest for adoption or custody after previously insisting that his
child learn Farsi and be raised in a Muslim household. Id. at 476-77. The court determined that
the adopting father had become the "equitable father" and imposed a duty of support on the
adopting father. Id. at 477-78.
307 See, e.g., In re Custody of R., 947 P.2d 745, 753-54 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). The court tried to
apply appropriate choice of law rules objectively, and the judge's only negative remark was aimed
at the mother for running away to the United States with her child. Id. The court chose the civil
court judgment based on the lack of jurisdiction of the Shari'a court and deference to the Pakistani
civil court's judgment that Muslim law would have not recognized the father's paternity because
the child was born out of wedlock. Id.
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his religion and ethnicity.3" The court noted that there were ample reasons
for refusing custody to the father and granting him supervised visitation
other than the mother's fear that he might kidnap the child and go to Tunisia,
which is not a signatory to the Hague Convention.3 09 The court pointed out
that the child was very young and there was little evidence that the father
knew how to care for him, the parties lived long distances from each other,
and the parties were not able to cooperate in caring for the child, not even
to the point of agreeing on a name for him.310
One example of a case where the court attempted to ensure evenhanded enforcement of parental rights for a Muslim father is Hosain v.
Malik, in which a Pakistani wife living in the United States challenged a
Pakistani court decision to grant her husband custody of their children,
while refusing to appear in a Pakistani court to provide evidence of her
allegations." The wife alleged that American law should apply because the
Pakistani court failed to apply the best interests standard in awarding
custody, as evidenced in part by the fact that the court awarded the husband
custody in Pakistan.3 12 The American court strenuously disagreed with the
wife, finding that the Pakistani court properly considered the children's
lifestyle in Pakistan as the appropriate standard for determining best
interests. 313
Similarly, in In re Brennan, involving a Muslim law student who had
a nonmarital child with a Christian mother who wanted to give the child up
for adoption, the court discussed at length the propriety of letting the unwed
father have custody of his child, noting that his family "are longtime and
well respected members of the community, economically comfortable and
of good moral character." 3 14 The court went on to discuss educational and
professional credentials of family members who would support the father
while he finished law school, and their suitability as guardians.31 5
A particularly good example of the courts' willingness to treat Muslim
parents on a par with other parents is Long v. Ardestani, in which an
American mother asked for an order preventing her Iranian ex-husband
from taking their children to Iran because of her fears that he would not
return them and that she could not get an enforceable Iranian court order to
308 See, e.g., Marzouki v. Marzouki, No. 96-3604, 1997 WL 716133, at *1-*4 (Wis. Ct. App.
Nov. 19, 1997).
309

Id. at *3.

310 Id. at *2-*3.
311 Hosain v. Malik, 671 A.2d 988, 990 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
312 Id. at 996, 998-99.

313 Id. at 998-1000.
314 In re Brennan, 134 N.W.2d 126, 129 (Minn. 1963).
315 id
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return them.316 The mother testified that in past years, the father had
threatened to take the children to Iran and not return them, and she
expressed her fear that Iran might force her preteen sons to stay in the
country so they could serve in the military.3 17 Despite these concerns, the
court held that the best interests of the child standard weighed in favor of
allowing the father to take his children to Iran, and the court deferred to
findings that the father was unlikely to stay in Iran, given all of his familial
ties and economic investment in the United States.318
In fact, in some cases, appellate courts were also willing to overturn
custody decisions against Muslim parents where there was no rational
explanation for awarding custody to the non-Muslim parent. In Ayyash v.
Ayyash, a non-Muslim mother had absconded with her children for six
years, in violation of her original custody order.31 9 When she was found, she
asked the court to modify custody to award her the children.32 0 When the
trial court gave her custody, the father appealed, suggesting that the trial
court had found against him because of racial stereotyping (he was a
Palestinian Muslim), as the trial court had acknowledged that he was a
responsible and fit parent.321 The appellate court recognized that there was
no valid ground for a change of custody based on witness testimony that the
father wanted his children to be raised "in a real society with a real religion"
according to his traditions and heritage, and the court rejected testimony
that "Palestinian men considered their wives and children to be
possessions."322 Acknowledging the trial court did not rely on either of these
statements in granting the mother custody, the appellate court noted:
"Indeed, for the trial judge to prefer one religion over another in deciding
custody-in a society as diverse as ours-would be most inappropriate.
And to suggest that it is a bad thing to expose the children to the traditions
and the heritage of either parent is insupportable by this record." 32 3
Some courts also show sensitivity about the need for Muslim children
to grow up in an environment consistent with their faith tradition. For
example, in In re Kafia M, a court took pains to recognize that a Muslim
foster family would have been better for a child placed out of her home, but
316 Long v. Ardestani, 624 N.W.2d 405, 408 (Wis. 2001). The mother pointed
out that Iran is not

a party to the Hague Convention, which would have obliged Iranian courts to aid in enforcing
such an order. Id.
31 Id. at 408-11.
31
8 Id at 417-18.
319 Ayyash v. Ayyash, 700 So.2d 752, 752-53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
320 Id at 753.
321

id

322 Id. at 756-57.
323 Id at 757.
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that none was available. 3 24 In In re Marriage of Malak, an appellate court
overturned a decision that awarded custody to a Lebanese mother who left
her family home in Lebanon for the United States.3 25 The U.S. court
recognized that the Lebanese court had made appropriate findings as to the
children's best interests under the UCCJA and ordered that the Lebanese
decree be enforced.3 26 Similarly, in Iqbal v. Iqbal, a court affirmed a trial
court order giving the Muslim father visitation rights on Friday afternoons
so he could take his daughter to the mosque.327
American courts in this period had a difficult time accepting
conservative gender norms in majority Islamic countries or sects and
sometimes employed modern Western assumptions about girls and women
in Muslim countries. In People v. Benu, a Muslim father was convicted of
endangering the welfare of his child for arranging the marriage of his 13year-old daughter to a 17-year-old male in a ceremony that allegedly
conformed to Muslim religious law. 328 There was conflicting testimony
about whether the girl was indeed interested in the young man and the father
was trying to prevent her from having non-marital relations, or if the
daughter was being pressured into a marriage that her father wanted.3 29
The appellate court expressed some ambivalence about this attempted
violation of American social norms, but ultimately sided with the American
view, quoting an Ohio opinion:
[N]either the physiology of man nor some of his more basic
instincts have changed much since he first became
identifiable as 'homo sapiens.' It is unquestioned that the
'mating instinct' per se is and has been throughout the
centuries one of such basic instincts, and that throughout
the centuries male and female persons have been physically
capable of realizing and fulfilling such instinct at an age

324 In re Kafia M., 742 A.2d 919, 925-26 (Me. 1999).

325 In re Marriage of Malak, 227 Cal. Rptr. 841, 846, 848 (Ct. App. 1986).
326 Id. at 848. These findings included the fact that the children "have many friends, neighbours
and relatives in Lebanon and they are tied up to their country .. . with lots of enviramental [sic],
traditional, social habits, heritage, moral and cultural links," that their original language was
Arabic and they were brought up as Muslims and would have difficulty continuing their religious
education, and the court wished to "avoid their exposal to shredding, loss, spiritual and physical
deficiency resulting from the radical change which will take place" if the children were transferred
to the United States without friends or relatives. Id. at 848 n. I. The court also considered the
economic circumstances of the parents, finding that the mother was unemployed and moved a lot,
while the father had a significant number of properties and businesses that the children could
inherit. Id.
327 lqbal v. lqbal, 625 N.Y.S.2d 605, 606 (App. Div. 1995).
328 People v. Benu, 385 N.Y.S.2d 222, 223-24 (Crim. Ct. 1976).
329 Id. at 223, 225.
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earlier than ... the minimum age at which two persons may
'be joined in marriage.'
It is a matter of historic fact, however, that until a
comparatively recent date the primary role played in
'marriages' all over the world by the female person was
solely that of consort and childbearer. Here again it is
evident that a woman may well be capable of these
activities prior to reaching the age of 16. It is also a matter
of fact that in many countries of the world today these
traditions still persist. It is noted, however, that, as a general
rule, whenever and wherever the scope of a 'wife's'
activity is limited by custom, tradition or law merely to
consortium and childbearing, she is looked upon as nothing
much more than a chattel-a piece of personal property to
be treated and dealt with as such.' 330
In Ali v. Ali, a court rejected a Muslim father's request to award him
custody when he argued that under Sharia law, the father is automatically
entitled to custody when a boy is seven years old, or nine years old upon
application by the mother."' According to the court, "such presumptions in
law cannot be said by any stretch of the imagination to comport with the
law of New Jersey whereby custody determinations are made based upon
the 'best interests' of the child and not some mechanical formula."332
In occasional cases involving claimed gender norm differences,
American courts expressed skepticism towards the litigant's claims about
Islamic law-some being simply incredible. In a criminal case involving a
Muslim father who had sexual intercourse with his 11-year-old
stepdaughter, arguing that Muslim practice permitted him to take a young
girl as his wife, the court discounted this claim, particularly in light of expert
testimony that Islam explicitly prohibits marriage with one's
stepdaughter.333

Id. at 227 (quoting State v. Gans, 151 N.E.2d 709, 713 (Ohio 1958)); see also Ashanti v. State,
No. 05-96-01920-CR, 1999 WL 39041, at *1, *3 (Tex. App. 1999), in which a father, convicted
of sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, claimed that she made it up because he was a Muslim and
because his stepdaughter was rebelling against the requirement to follow the strict rules of his
faith about dress, including a scarf and long dress. The court apparently did not accept this
explanation for the allegation of abuse.
331 Ali v. Ali, 652 A.2d 253, 259 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994).
3 32 id.
3
Accomack Cty. Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Muslimani, 403 S.E.2d 1, 2 (Va. Ct. App. 1991). The
case itself was the father's challenge to a decision that his natural daughters be placed in the
custody of their mother rather than in his, due to concerns about whether he would abuse them as
he had done his two stepdaughters. See also Ibrahim v. Ibrahim, 825 S.W.2d 391, 393-94, 397
(Mo. Ct. App. 1992), in which a father appealed a trial court decision awarding custody of the
330
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Perhaps the most direct and extended example of a judge expressing
strong disagreement with the defendant's religion can be found in
Muhammad v. Muhammad, in which a Black Muslim was interrogated
about his beliefs about white people and admitted that he planned to teach
his children that white people are devils, as taught by his religion.334 The
trial judge's interaction with the appellant husband's spiritual counselor
during a preliminary proceeding was, to say the least, unusual:

-

MARVIN MUHAMMAD: For four hundred years we have
been over here being mistreated by you.
THE COURT: By [Mr. Blalock]?
MARVIN MUHAMMAD: Not you in particular.
MR. BLALOCK [counsel for the wife]: Am I a devil?
MARVIN MUHAMMAD: If you had been in the days of
your forefathers
[ALL SPEAK AT ONCE; UNINTELLIGIBLE]
THE COURT: Wait a minute, that's so tired, that's such a
tired argument. Please don't bore me with that.
MARVIN MUHAMMAD: Well, he brought it up, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: I don't care if he brings it up. I'm telling
you that that's the tiredest argument that there has ever
been. Please don't give me that....
MARVIN MUHAMMAD: You wanted the truth, didn't
you?
THE COURT: Yeah, and that ain't the truth. That's a bunch
of bull as far I'm concerned. It's no worse than a man
coming in here and wearing a white robe and talking about
how no good blacks are because they are black.
MARVIN MUHAMMAD: No, I didn't enslave you all for
four hundred years; you all did that to us.
THE COURT: And I didn't enslave you. I didn't enslave
anybody.
MARVIN MUHAMMAD: So I'm not going to make an
apology to you for your mistreatment of me.
THE COURT: Wait a minute, whoa. I've mistreated you?
MARVIN MUHAMMAD: You as a people have

parties' child to the wife after years of abuse, threats, and the father's absconding with their child.
Defendant alleged bias by the trial court due to the fact that the trial was conducted just before the
United States declared war on Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait, where his parents lived, and
because the judge referred to the husband's "Arab and Moslem" status. Id at 397. The appellate
court described these claims as "prattle" and rejected the claim of bias. Id.
334 Muhammad v. Muhammad, 622 So.2d 1239, 1244 (Miss. 1993).
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mistreated us as a people.
THE COURT: Oh, that's a bunch of bull. I have not done
anything to you, and it-of course, we have a difference of
philosophies, but I will tell you this: I don't treat and teach
my children to hate anybody because of the color of their
skin. In fact, I say you should never do that. But you want
equality on one side and you want it back on the other. It
don't work that way.
MARVIN MUHAMMAD: Allah has revealed what I just
said, that the Caucasian is the devil. So, I'm not going to
deny that simply for advantage, for some kind of advantage
from you.
THE COURT: I guess a guy that's in a Ku Klux Klan could
say the same thing, that Jesus Christ came to him in a dream
and told him that black people were devils.
MARVIN MUHAMMAD: Well, they've inflicted enough
hatred and murder on my people, so they obviously felt
something about us that was unjustified, but I didn't come
to Europe and steal white people from their land and
enslave them; y'all came to Africa and stole us, so don't try
to put that jacket me.
THE COURT: I've never been to Africa in my life. I've
never been to Africa in my life. 33 5

Following testimony from the wife that she would
raise her children to respect everyone, the trial judge in
Muhammad replied:
THE COURT: Well, of course I'm white so I guess I'm
sensitive somewhat to somebody calling me a devil or
whatever. I don't feel very devilish .. .; or teaching people
that I'm a devil because of what happened in the pastwhich is fine; that's his thing. But I have a different
philosophy in raising my children; that is, I don't tell them,
you know, you're in this particular situation because maybe
blacks did so-and-so or Indians did so-and-so or Chinese or
tall people or anything else. Our children are raised-we
don't make a big distinction about race. It's just not a big
point in our house, not a point at all. But if you had the
children, what would your posture be on that type of
thing?336

335 Id. at 1244-45.
336 Id at 1245.
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After further testimony that Marvin Muhammad
would want to live in a separate territory and refuse
participation in American politics, the judge continued:
THE COURT [TO ROBERT MUHAMMAD]: There a lot
of things you say I completely one hundred percent agree
with. I don't like being called a devil but on the other
handROBERT MUHAMMAD: My children would never come
up and call you that.
THE COURT: No, but you did, but nonetheless, that makes
no difference.
ROBERT MUHAMMAD: Okay, but as far as what we
teach our children, ITHE COURT: That's what you choose to believe or teach
them, and that's fine.
ROBERT MUHAMMAD: Yes, sir. Because the Christians
teach their children to believe in Santa Claus, but you
know, that's totally unfounded and unheard of. So I can't
sit up and debate with you because it would be endless. You
know, you have your opinion and you would probably stick
to it, and I'd have mine.
THE COURT: That's right. And I'm saying that is your
religion and that's-that is not going to have anything to
do with this decision.
ROBERT MUHAMMAD: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: There are white people who would sit up
there and tell you that blacks are parasites on society, and
you say that whites are devils. I think all of y'all are wrong,
but nonetheless, that's your opinion. So that hasn't got
anything to do with anything....
THE COURT: Thank you. Let me first go to the issue of
the business of your religion. At one point Mr. Muhammad
and Mrs. Muhammad came to my office and brought an ex
parte order, and we had a discussion about that. I'd like to
have a copy of my Opinion-any of you have that? [court is
tendered copy of his opinion.] Now what I said was:
"This opinion has dealt with the tenets and
practices of the Islamic Religion for a specific
reason. The folkways and mores of the followers
mainstream
different
from
of Islam are
America. Being different does not infer being
wrong, but it does pose distinct problems in the
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adjudicationof this case." 337

In remanding the Mohammad case for review on other grounds, the
appellate court concluded, "[a]lthough the chancellor did make some
undoubtedly inappropriate statements of personal opinion, it does not
appear that the chancellor's decisions were the result of any bias and they
are supported by the evidence."33 8
However, in explaining why Mrs. Muhammad was entitled to get a
divorce for extreme cruelty, the appellate court could not resist commenting
on the Islamic sect in which the Muhanimads had chosen to live:
Virtually every aspect of life of the University is impacted
by religious doctrine. The social and family structure is
strongly paternal. Men are viewed as the maintainers of
their wives and children. Women are required to submit to
their husbands. The role of the woman is viewed primarily
as being the helpmate of her husband. Child care is one of
her chief responsibilities. Women make no decisions. They
cannot leave the confines of the community without the
permission of their husband. Members of the faith are not
allowed to ingest alcohol, tobacco, drugs or other
intoxicating substances. Neither are they allowed to eat red
meat. Although the food supply is adequate in quantity, the
diet at the University is fairly limited to beans, broccoli,
fish, bread, cauliflower, and sometimes corn. Meals are
restricted to one per day for adults. Fasting from these
meals periodically occurs. Women are required to
breastfeed their children. At least some of the milk and
juices received by women through the Women, Infants and
Children (WIC) program go to the operation of a bakery.
Mail is subject to being censored.339
B. MUSLIMS IN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE CASES
Most cases involving the legitimacy of marriages and divorces became
complicated for Muslims when the parties underwent Muslim marriage
ceremonies either before or as a substitute for civil marriages.340 Some cases

3 Id. at 1246-47 (emphasis in original).
33 Id. at 1251.
339 Id. at 1242.
340 See Salah v. Awes, 629 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), in which the parties to a Hague
Convention custody dispute involving Minnesota and Canada agreed that they underwent only an
Islamic marriage and not a civil marriage. The child's mother, who moved to Minnesota, allegedly
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involving Muslim spouses stand at the intersection of nation-state marriage
requirements and Islamic law requirements for recognizing a valid marriage
or divorce. But these cases do not seem to elicit as many stereotypical
remarks about Islam as in other cases, and the facts often do pose concems
that might legitimately be raised about the intersection of secular and
religious laws in the United States, a country that recognizes the separation
of church and state.
In cases during this period, judges sometimes stated that they could
acknowledge Islamic law but that they could not recognize it as law if not
emanating from a court recognized by a secular country. For example, in
Farahv. Farah,a Virginia woman sued her claimed husband for divorce.34 1
The husband claimed that their marriage was void under English law
because they had entered a proxy marriage by signing a marriage contract
("Nikah") and having a ceremony performed by an imam, with proxies
standing in for them in England.3 42 The husband argued that this marriage
did not comply with English law, which had a fifteen day residency
requirement for marriage as well as requirements for a license and a state
certificate of the marriage.3 43 The wife argued that the proxy wedding,
recognized in her Islamic sect, had been affirmed as valid in Pakistan
through a special ceremony there. 3" However, the Virginia court applied
English law and held that the parties were not married.3 45
Similarly, in In re Marriageof Vryonis, the California court refused to
recognize as a putative wife a woman who subjectively believed that she
had been married through of a private ceremony, which she alleged was
valid as a "Muta" marriage authorized by her Muslim sect.346 The court held

because of spousal abuse, thus argued that she could not return to Canada because she would be
deported after her "husband" cancelled his support affidavit for her. Cf Gazipura v. Gazipura, 652
So.2d 266, 267-68 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994) (detailing a wife's conversion from Islam to Jehovah's
Witness after marrying her husband, leading to marital problems. This case, however, concerned
payment of support and not any custody or divorce disputes).
341 Farah v. Farah, 429 S.E.2d 626, 627 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
342 Id. (explaining that some sects in Islam, including the Ahmadiyya sect to which the wife
belonged, permit men and women to be married through a ceremony in which a proxy attends in
place of one or more of the parties-as in this case, where neither party was in England).
343 Id at 628.
344 Id at 628-29.
345 Id. at 629-30. Moreover, the court concluded that the wedding in Pakistan was merely
ceremonial and did not constitute the act of marriage under Islamic law. Id. However, the court
noted, "[U]nder the tradition of the wife's Islamic sect, the 'Rukhsati' symbolizes the sending
away of the bride with her husband." Id
346 In re Marriage of Vryonis, 248 Cal. Rptr. 807, 809 (Ct. App. 1988). Although the Civil Code
section at issue has since been repealed, the Court understood a putative marriage to exist if either
of both parties believe, in good faith, that the marriage was valid but receive a determination that
the marriage is void or voidable. Id. at 811 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 4452 (repealed 1994)).
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that, although the woman was ignorant about marriage laws in the United
States and that her claimed husband assured her that they were married, her
good-faith belief in the legitimacy of their marriage had to be about its
legitimacy under California state law, not under Islamic law.34 7 Because the
parties did not engage in any of the indicia of marriage-such as living
together or commingling finances-the court found no basis for holding that
the putative wife had a good-faith, objectively reasonable belief that the
couple had met state law requirements for marriage.3 48
Furthermore, in Seth v. Seth, while a trial court permitted expert
testimony about talaq, the court ultimately applied Texas law, ignored the
talaq divorce, and ruled that the husband's first marriage was still valid.349
It based its decision, in part, on the fact that "there was no factual showing
that any official state body in either India or Kuwait had actually executed
or confirmed the divorce and marriage."3 50
Despite these examples of courts applying laws of U.S. states, some
courts during this period recognized marriages where the parties'
performance was recognized by Islamic law, despite some of the formal
procedures required by under state law either being missing or
accomplished out of order. For example, in Shike v. Shike, after the parties
married in an Islamic law ceremony in Pakistan, the husband came to the
United States and applied for a marriage license, asked for the statutory 72hour waiting period to be waived, and then took the license to his local imam
for a marriage ceremony.35 1 Because the ceremony ("Nikkha") had already
been conducted in Pakistan, the imam refused to perform a marriage
ceremony again, but he did sign the license.3 52 The Texas court held that
failure to conduct a second ceremony did not invalidate the marriage:
Prior to trial, the court found that a ceremony was not
performed on April 2, 1992. The evidence at trial also
showed that a ceremony was not performed on that date.
The validity of the marriage license, however, was not
affected by this mistake.

347

. .

. Both parties had previously

Id. at 812-13.

348 Id at 813-15; but see Aldainy v. Aldainy, No. C2-97-784, 1997 WL 561267,
at *2 (Minn. Ct.

App. Sept. 9, 1997) (determining that a second "wife"-who had a marriage license in South
Dakota, where proof of divorce was not required, and who was married in a Muslim ceremony at
the Islamic Center of Minnesota-could claim the status of putative spouse where it was
determined that her husband was not legally divorced from his first wife, whom he had married
in Saudi Arabia).
349 Seth v. Seth, 694 S.W.2d 459, 462-64 (Tex. App. 1985).
35ld. at 463.
351 Shike v. Shike, No. 14-97-00888-CV, 2000 WL 490696, at *1 (Tex.
App. Apr. 27, 2000).
352 Id. at *3.
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entered into marriage in Pakistan through the performance
of a Muslim marriage ceremony. They followed the proper
procedures to obtain a marriage license in Texas. After the
parties were informed that a Nikkha was a recognized
marriage ceremony, they continued forward with the
process and did not object to [the imam] signing the license.
Therefore, we find [the imam]'s signing of the license
without performing a ceremony did not affect the validity
of the already existent marriage between John and Saba
Shike; it merely confirmed it in accordance with Texas
law. 353
Some courts also deferred to Islamic law and authority where it could
35 4
be determined and was not in conflict with laws in the United States. For
example, in Aghili v. Saadatnejadi, a husband filed suit to invalidate a
marriage conducted by a congregational member who was not the official
imam of their mosque, although he did carry out some of an imam's
duties. 355 The court, however, looked to an Islamic law expert, who stated
in his affidavit:
Islamic law stipulates quite precisely that anyone with the
requisite knowledge of Islamic law is competent to perform
religious ceremonies, including marriage. One is not
required to have an official position in a religious
institution such as a mosque (masjid) in order to be
qualified to perform such ceremonies. From the vantage
point of Islamic jurisprudence, the question of his right to
bear the title imam is irrelevant. His competence before
Islamic law to perform Muslim ceremonies is determined
solely by his knowledge of that legal corpus. It is quite clear
that Mr. Tarahian does possess such knowledge and that he
is recognized by members of the Muslim community as
possession [sic] the competence to perform religious (and
civil) ceremonies.35 6

353 Id.

354 See. e.g., M.H. v. M.G., 658 N.Y.S.2d 551, 555 (Fam. Ct. 1996) (recognizing the validity of
an Egyptian support order based on similar principles to New York's: "The Egyptian Court stated
that the Father has an obligation from the Koran and Egyptian civil law to support his child
'appropriate to the Father's financial state'. . . and that obligation does not disappear simply
because the Father does. New York also imposes an obligation on the parents to provide support
for their child based on the combined income of both parents.").
355 Aghili v. Saadatnejadi, 958 S.W.2d 784, 788 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
356 Id. at 788; see also Shamsee v. Shamsee, 381 N.Y.S.2d 127, 127 (App. Div. 1976) (rejecting
a husband's claim in a divorce action that his marriage twenty years previously was invalid
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On the other hand, just as states may refuse to recognize the marriage
and divorce laws in other jurisdictions that violate the recognizing state's
public policy,35 7 some courts in this period refused to recognize Islamic
marriage or divorce procedures that violated that state's public policy, even
if permitted under laws of other countries. For example, in Maklad v.
Maklad, the Connecticut Supreme Court refused to recognize a talaq
divorce conducted in Connecticut, even though it was affirmed as valid in
an Egyptian court.35 8 The Connecticut court reasoned that the wife had
received neither notice nor other due process in the Egyptian court, and she
had not been given an opportunity to consent in the Connecticut talaq
divorce.35 9
Muslim divorce customs trouble U.S. courts in particular both because
of the concern for potentially vulnerable wives and because the customs
violate other public policy concerns in the given state. 36 0 In In re Marriage
of Dajani, a wife in a divorce proceeding attempted to enforce her marital
contract dowry (mahr), which granted her the bulk of her dowry upon
divorce, as is customary. 361 The husband defended by using an expert who
testified that a dowry is forfeited if a wife initiates a divorce, although the
wife argued that the expert was not qualified to make a judgment based on
Islamic law.362 The California court used a much different approach, finding
that the agreement was essentially an antenuptial agreement which
encouraged divorce, in violation of California public policy, and ruled it
void.363
Similarly, in Seth v. Seth, an alleged second wife introduced testimony
that her husband converted to Islam and divorced his first wife through
talaq, then married her. 36 The husband and his first wife claimed that the
purpose of his conversion to Islam was only to take advantage of talaq
because the Islamic judge ("qadi"), who performed the ceremony was not registered with the New
York City clerk, as required by New York law).
3 See, e.g., People v. Ezeonu, 558 N.Y.S.2d 116, 117 (Sup. Ct. 1992) ("Generally, a marriage is
recognized in New York if it is valid where consummated. However, it is well established that
this general rule does not apply where recognition of a marriage is repugnant to public policy.")
(internal citations omitted); but see Ahmed v. Ahmed, 689 N.Y.S.2d 357 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (rejecting
the defendant's argument that the parties' wedding ceremony was a "purely religious marriage"
without any intended legal consequences, on the basis that the parties had "participated in a valid
marriage ceremony" which satisfied New York law).
358 Maklad v. Makland, No. FA000443796S, 2001 WL 51662, at *3 (Conn. Jan. 3, 2001).
359 id

36 E.g., In re Marriage of Dajani, 251 Cal. Rptr. 871, 872 (Ct. App. 1988) (refusing to validate a
prenuptial agreement it considered as "designed to facilitate divorce.").
361 id
362 Id.

363 id

3

Seth v. Seth, 694 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. App. 1985).
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divorce, such that their divorce was not valid under Islamic law.3 65 While
the court permitted competing expert testimony about whether talaq was
valid under Islamic law if a person converted only to utilize talaq, the court
refused to apply Islamic law.3 66 Instead, the court held that even if Islamic
law validated the talaq, "the harshness of such a result to the non-Muslim
divorced wife runs so counter to our notions of good morals and natural
justice that we hold that Islamic law in this situation need not be applied."367
During this period, different American courts came to different
conclusions in deciding whether to enforce a traditional Islamic marriage
contract when it did not meet the statutory requirements of secular
antenuptial contracts. In Habibi-Fahnrichv. Fahnrich, a court refused to
enforce a sadaq, an Islamic marriage contract, which the non-Muslim
husband claimed he had been pressured into signing without any
explanation of its validity and without any counsel.3 68 In this particular case,
although the court recognized the validity of sadaqs generally, it refused to
enforce the sadaq in question because it did not meet the statute of frauds
requirements.36 9
By contrast, in Mehtar v. Mehtar, the court held that an Islamic
marriage contract entered into when the parties married in South Africa
could be enforced as an antenuptial contract to effectuate the religious
intentions of the parties, despite not meeting Connecticut's procedural
requirement that the parties make financial disclosures to each other before

36 5

Id at 463.

366 id.
367 Id; but see Hosain v. Malik, 671 A.2d 988, 1006 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996)
(in response to a wife's claim that returning to Pakistan might result in her being stoned for
adultery, citing an extensive colloquy between the husband and his attorney that established that
no woman had been stoned for adultery in Pakistan for fifty years because of the Islamic
requirement that at least four witnesses attest that they witnessed the adultery before a woman can
be convicted).
368 Habibi-Fahnrich v. Fahnrich, No. 46186/93, 1995 WL 507388, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995)
("[T]he SADAQ is the Islamic marriage contract. It is a document which defines the precepts of
the Moslem marriage by providing for financial compensation to a woman for the loss of her status
and value in the community if the marriage ends in a divorce. This court has previously determined
in this case that a SADAQ may be enforceable in this court.").
369 Id. at *1-*2; ef In re Marriage of Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 866-67 (Ct. App. 2001)
(concluding that the parties' marriage contract did not provide sufficient reference to specific
Islamic law property division rules to permit the husband to keep all of the property he earned as
separate property, rather than community property as required by California law. The husband had
only relied on two vague provisions of the contract to establish that his wife had agreed to be
bound by this property rule: "The above legal marriage has been concluded in Accordance with
his Almighty God's Holy Book and the Rules of his Prophet to whom all God's prayers and
blessings be, by legal offer and acceptance from the two contracting parties"; and the "two parties
[have] taken cognizance of the legal implications.").
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the contract is signed."' The court reasoned:
The protection of the justified expectations of the parties
should take precedence over the imposition of Connecticut
law on a marriage negotiated and entered into under a
South African law allowing for recognition of religious
principles. While Connecticut has an interest because the
parties live here and the marriage, while short existed here,
that interest does not, in this case, outweigh the interest in
the parties in their jointly held expectations, certainty, and
predictability. This is especially so because of the short
duration of the marriage, and the purpose of the antenuptial
agreement.371
In Derakhshan v. Derakhshan, a husband argued before a Virginia
court that his Iranian Islamic marriage contract was not enforceable because
part of the consideration for it was the wife's agreement to engage in sexual
relations, 3 72 an argument that has been successful in several states, including
Virginia, when women in nonmarital situations attempted to enforce oral
contracts to support them.3 73 However, the Virginia court refuted this
argument and held that this contract was not against public policy, because
sexual intercourse between a married couple is not illicit or
morally reprehensible. In fact, sexual intercourse is a
necessary act to consummate any marriage. The parties'
marriage contract is not based on future illicit sexual
relations because a promise to marry is automatically
coupled with an intention to perform sexual relations.
Without such an intent, the marriage would be a nullity.3 74

Thus, the court held that, because this agreement was treated as a valid
contract under Iranian law, and it was not unusual in amount, the contract
for "one holy Qur'an, a piece of flower, plus twenty million Rials (Iranian
currency), with no further conditions" was enforceable and would be treated
370 Mehtar v. Mehtar, No. FA 960080007S, 1997 WL 576540, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 5,
1997); see also Akileh v. Eschehal, 666 So. 2d 246, 249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that
an Islamic marriage contract was sufficiently specific to enforce as an antenuptial agreement).
371 Mehtar, 1997 WL 576540, at *2. Despite its holding, the court still ordered rehabilitative
alimony for the wife under Connecticut law, since she was not able to support herself as she could
have in South Africa. Id.
372 Derakhshan v. Derakhshan, Chancery No. 142811,1997 WL 1070620, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. June
16, 1997).
373 Id. (citing Burke v. Shaver, 23 S.E. 749, 749 (Va. 1895)); see also Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d
106, 112 (Cal. 1976) (holding that non-marital contracts could be enforced except to the extent
that they relied on meretricious services).
374 Derakhshan, 1997 WL 1070620, at *1.
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as the wife's separate property in the divorce.3 75
On the other hand, as with criminal cases, courts have been less
sympathetic towards parties they suspect are raising Islamic law as an
excuse to avoid legal obligations under American law. For example, in
Haynes v. Almuttar, an ex-wife appealed a trial court's finding that there
was a change in circumstances now permitting her to go to work, which
3 76
would reduce the ex-husband's child support and spousal maintenance.
She argued that, under Islamic law, parents have a responsibility to closely
supervise their children, so she had to stay home and not work outside of
the home.3 77 The court did not find her claim that she needed to be home
under Islamic law credible, especially in light of evidence that Islam had
become less important to her since the divorce, and that she was going out
to exercise at a gym several nights a week.17 1
As previously noted, family law cases involving Muslims in this period
generally evinced fewer stereotypes about Muslims and Islam, and more
often applied standard family law principles to cases involving Muslims
from divorce cases to custody and termination of parental rights cases.
However, the facts in these cases often made for more difficult decisions
because, for example, parents fighting over custody or visitation were of
different faiths, or one parent had ties to a Muslim-majority country, raising
concerns about kidnapping or other custodial concerns. While few courts
applied Islamic law on issues such as marriage and divorce, custody, and
visitation unless confirmed by a secular national court, occasionally courts
did at least review Islamic law on issues such as property division and the
relevance of Muslim marriage and divorce practices in establishing valid
American marriages and divorces. A few courts attempted to counter
stereotypes that seemed to infect lower court decisions, e.g., about Muslim
parents' ability to be good custodians of their children, while others had a
more difficult time accepting conservative gender norms of litigants from
Muslim-majority countries, or even stereotyped Islamic attitudes toward
women. Yet, the courts showed a consistent concern for protecting women's
rights, especially in marriage and divorce cases.

IV. CIVIL CASES
Beyond criminal and family law cases, there are a small number of
cases in civil areas that involved some reference to Islam or the Muslim

375 Id

376 Haynes v. Almuttar, 25 S.W.3d 667, 671 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 672.
378 Id.

2019]

ISLAM IN THE MIND OFAMERICAN

93

affiliation of a party from 1960 to September 11, 2001. The majority of
these cases involve employment or public accommodations discrimination,
some occasionally referencing anxiety about Black Muslims and other
concerns. 379

The most common difficulty that arose in the discrimination cases
during this period, as with many cases today, was how to treat Muslims'
complaints about maltreatment because of differences in their dress or
religious practices, such as prayer. The complaints could be treated either
as legitimate claims of discrimination, or as requests for special
accommodations, which employers or others would be free to grant or
refuse.
The most vociferously debated response to this issue comes in Bilal v.
Northwest Airlines, when Renae Bilal, the spouse of a Northwest Airlines
employee, was turned away from a flight because she did not follow the
dress code mandated for air travel by employees when they were not on
duty.380 A Northwest customer service supervisor, Barb Patrick, stopped
Bilal on her way to her seat because Bilal was dressed in typical Middle
Eastern dress-a headscarf, tunic, dress pants, and sandals without socks.381
While technically only her bare feet violated the dress code, Patrick insisted
that Bilal's clothing was "inappropriate" and that she should dress "as
though she were going to church."3 82 Ultimately, Bilal was told by Patrick
and the manager, who supported Patrick's position, that she could board the
plane.3 83 Nevertheless, Ms. Bilal filed a state civil rights suit because of the
anxiety and humiliation she had suffered through the incident."
A majority of the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's
determination that Bilal had suffered discrimination because of her
treatment for her clothing, and because Patrick told Bilal that she should
have dressed "like [she was] going to church."3 85 In discussing whether the
supervisor was aware that Bilal was a Muslim when she made that remark,
Patrick testified that she knew the difference between "Muslims" and
"Moslems," and that she knew how adherents to Islam appeared from books
and TV, that is, "they wear dark-colored clothes and have their heads
covered." 386 She claimed that she made the remark about dressing for

3 See supra Part II.
380 Bilal v. Nw. Airlines, No. C4-94-416, 1994 WL 593939, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App.
Nov. 1, 1994),
rev'd, 537 N.W.2d 614 (Minn. 1995).
381 Id
382

id

383 Id.
384 Id. at *6.
385 Id at *4.
386 Id. at *3.
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church since she and Bilal were both African American and Bilal would
therefore know what that meant. 1 7 Even though Bilal explained to Patrick
and the manager that she was dressed properly for prayer in her religion,
3 88
Patrick had continued to give her trouble about boarding the plane. The
majority of the appellate court thus concluded:
the statement that she should dress as if going to
church[]indicates inferentially that religion played at least
some role as a motivating factor in Patrick's decision to
question Bilal, and in her comments regarding Bilal's
attire.... Patrick's comment acted to stigmatize and isolate

Ms. Bilal as a Muslim and supports the Court's finding of
unlawful public accommodation discrimination based on
religion.38 9
Minnesota Court of Appeals Judge James Randall filed a lengthy and
strongly worded dissent arguing that the supervisor's comments, especially
the comment about church, amounted to insufficient evidence of public
accommodations discrimination.390 He pointed out that Bilal had violated
39
the dress code, if only because of her bare, sandaled feet. ' He further
objected to the assumption that anyone should have known that Bilal was a
Muslim, as opposed to merely a foreign traveler in a diverse crowd of air
passengers, simply because of her dress.3 92 Finally, he went on a lengthy
discourse about the way in which "church" is used in a generic way to mean
a place of worship, rather than a specific reference to a Christian structure

387 Id. at *4.
388 Bilal v. Nw. Airlines, 537 N.W.2d 614, 619 (Minn. 1995).

Bilal, 1994 WL 593939, at *3-4. The court concluded, however, that no damages were due to
Bilal's husband, who was not there, because he could not show any tangible harm due to his wife's
denial of "full and equal enjoyment of NWA's services." Id at *7.
390 Id. at *9 (Randall, J., dissenting) ("I accept plaintiffs' claim that Patrick's reference to the word
'church' could be offensive to them. What I do not accept is plaintiffs' theory that the mere word
'church,' even if taken in the narrow literal sense of a Christian church, is actionable on its face
when spoken in the presence of a person practicing a religion other than christianity.").
391 Id. (Randall, J., dissenting); but see Wazeerud-Din v. Goodwill Home and Missions, 737 A.2d
683, 687-90 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (concluding that a Muslim applicant could not sue
a religious society for being rejected by its "discipleship program," a residential program using
religious instruction to help addicts beat their addictions. The court held that such a religious
program was expressly excepted from the state's discrimination statute, as a place of public
accommodation, because it was an educational facility operated by a religious institution. The
institution noted that it would admit non-Christians who were open to considering conversion, but
that other non-Christians would not be supportive to those who were trying to beat their addictions,
and thus might disrupt the progress of the others in the program).
392 Bilal, 1994 WL 593939, at *10 (Randall, J., dissenting).
39
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or gathering.393 On these final points, the Minnesota Supreme Court agreed
with him. 394

One issue that arose in several cases in this period, and challenges
courts even today, is whether employers are required to accommodate
Muslim employees' grooming and dress differences; food prohibitions,
such as the proscription against handling pork or alcohol for some; and their
daily prayer obligations. A few of the cases in this period, however, also
involved pervasive workplace harassment of Muslim employees.
In In re Eastern Greyhound Lines, an employee complained of
religious discrimination when he was denied a job because he would not
shave his beard, as would have been required for him to conform to the
company grooming policy that men "must be clean-shaven."" In this case,
the New York Court of Appeals found no violation because there was no
evidence that the grooming policy was motivated by religious
discrimination.396 The court rejected the argument that the Human Rights
Law required the employer to accommodate the plaintiff's beliefs about his
obligation to grow a beard.3 97 New York courts reached a similar conclusion
in Abdush-Shahid v. New York State Narcotics Addiction Control
Commission, when the Narcotics Addiction Control Commission enforced
its dress code against an orthodox Sunni Muslim.3 98 Abdush-Shahid had

393 Id. at *12-15 (Randall, J., dissenting). Judge Randall discussed the secular way in which
Christmas is treated by the state; the possible offense to white supremacists of the Martin Luther
King, Jr., holiday; to the followers of Elijah Muhammad and black Muslims of the holiday for
George Washington and other Founders who were slaveholders; and to Native peoples of the
recognition of Christopher Columbus. Id. at *13-*14 (Randall, J., dissenting). He concluded that
while many Americans may take legitimate offense at such actions, the offense was not necessarily
actionable, especially given the protections of the First Amendment. Id. at *17-19 (Randall, J.,
dissenting). For Randall, actionable discrimination would require something like a separate dress
code for Christians and non-Christians, or lower boarding priority for Muslims, or refusal to let a
Muslim board simply because she was a Muslim and not for her dress. Id. at *20 (Randall, J.,
dissenting). Randall suggested that minorities would be the ones to suffer from this kind of
argument, since they would not be able to use analogous words in their own speech. Id. at *21
(Randall, J., dissenting).
394 Bilal, 537 N.W.2d at 619.
395 E. Greyhound Lines Div. of Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 265
N.E.2d 745, 746 (N.Y. 1970).
396 Id. at 746-47.

3 Id. at 747; see also Phoebe v. State Div. of Human Rights, 418 N.Y.S.2d 55, 56 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1979) (holding that a supervisor's decision to enforce a dress code against a Muslim
employee was evidence of an act of retaliation for her complaint with the state anti-discrimination
agency, filed eight days earlier. The court noted that on the day of her reprimand, she was wearing
an ankle-length skirt, in keeping with her religious tradition, instead of regulation slacks or a kneeexposing skirt because her uniform was not yet dry, while another employee was allowed to wear
non-regulation slacks without punishment).
39 Abdush-Shahid v. N.Y. State Narcotics Addiction Control Comm'n, No. 1586/72, 1972 WL
20370, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jun. 8, 1972).
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converted two months after his employment commenced; he began to wear
"'Sunni dress' including a Biadlia, or long kafkan, and a skull cap" to work
instead of the business suit, tie, and jacket required by the dress code.3 99
However, the court saw no reason to allow him an exemption from the dress
code. 40
In Moore v. Dimars, a food accommodation case, a prisoner filed a
civil action for an accommodation, objecting to his work detail based on
being required to handle pork products that were placed into bags for the
kitchen, as well as its interference with his prayer obligation at noon, when
he was scheduled to be working.40 1 While he was initially given an
accommodation on both issues, one of his supervisors refused to
accommodate him because he did not trust the sincerity of the prisoner's
beliefs.40 2 Instead of disciplining him for failure to follow instructions, the
prisoner was simply taken out of his work assignment and given a new one
two months later. 40 3 The court praised the staff for accommodating rather
than disciplining the prisoner:
Where an accommodation requested is generously given, it
is commendable. Where it is refused or expected, it
becomes a problem . . . there was plenty of other work

which did not need such accommodation which would not
conflict with the petitioner's religious beliefs. This was
done without singling petitioner out in a discriminatory
way.404

This sits in stark contrast to Abdush-Shahid, in which the court saw no
reason that the plaintiff should be allowed an exemption from the dress code
when it was reasonable and did not violate his constitutional rights.
Regrettably, some of the cases during this period in which Muslim
litigants appeared were cases of serious religious harassment, mirroring the
kind of Muslim-bashing that Americans have seen since September 11,
2001. In Rasheedv. Chrysler Motors Corporation,a Chrysler employee and
Muslim convert alleged that he was subjected to daily harassment based on
his faith after he transferred to a different Chrysler plant.40 5 His supervisor
expressed his dislike for Muslims and rejected the plaintiff s request for an

399id

400 id
401

Moore v. Dimars, No. CV 980578839, 1999 WL 235783, at *1

1999).
402 id
403 id
404 d

405

v

Rasheed v. Chrysler Corp., 517 N.W.2d 19, 23 (Mich. 1994).

(Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 9,
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accommodation of his 8:00 P.M. meal break so that he could observe
Ramadan. 40 6 The plaintiff was suspended for unrelated disobedience, such
as tossing some cylinder heads into a divider, which dented them, although
he alleged that other employees had done the same thing without
punishment.40 7 The court upheld a jury verdict, determining that the claims
of disobedience were pretext for religious discrimination.4 08
In another case, Serafini v. Superior Court, an employee sued the
company's owners and his supervisor for religious harassment. 409 The
employee claimed:
They continually yelled, swore at, and used vulgar
language directed to [plaintiff] Khadir. On several different
occasions, they berated him for being a practicing Muslim;
they yelled and swore at Khadir for praying on Friday ...
and said he was stupid and abnormal for not praying on
Sunday. They made remarks . . . [that] all Muslims or
people of Khadir's race were terrorists, that after the
Oklahoma bombing many people would be seeking
vindication against Muslims, that Khadir should "watch
out" and "run for his life."4 10

'

Similarly, in Chaudhary v. Taco Bell, a Pakistani employee of Taco
Bell claimed his managers subjected him to physical and verbal abuse.41
One, Mukhtar Mohemmad, abused and hit Chaudhary because he was
Pakistani, and the other "mocked Chaudhary's religious beliefs and
regularly referred to Chaudhary as 'Muslim dog."' 4 12 When he was denied
work modifications after suffering a heart attack on the job from the stress
of this treatment, he sued Taco Bell for religious, national origin, and
disability discrimination. 4 13 However, the court held that it did not have
jurisdiction to hear the case.4 14

40 6

Id.; cf Coffin v. Atraqchi, No. 00-156, 2000 WL 898748, at *1 (Mont. July 6, 2000). Ina civil
trial between the original owners of a property and a person who bought it at a delinquent tax sale,
the original owners asked for the trial date to be continued for the entire month of Ramadan (Dec.
8, 1999-Jan. 8, 2000), and because they also had a pretrial hearing in another case in February.
The district court denied this motion and the appellate court held that the owners had not
demonstrated sufficient prejudice. Id
407 Rasheed, 517 N.W.2d at 23.
408 Id. at 33.
409 Serafini v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 159, 160-61 (Ct. App. 1998).
4101d at 161.
411 Chaudhary v. Taco Bell Corp., No. 952093, 1995 WL 1312539, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1995).
412 id

413 id
414 id
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Islam became a referent in some employment discrimination cases as
well, with courts following standard patterns in affirming or rejecting
claims typical of cases not involving Muslim litigants. In Rhode Island
Departmentof Correctionsv. Rhode Island Commissionfor Human Rights,
a Black Muslim convert was denied a correctional officer job despite his
4 15
Because the
strong scores on training and testing prior to job interviewS
unable to
were
scores
interviewers who gave him low job interview
remember or articulate why they did so, the court affirmed the decision of
the Human Rights Commission, which found a violation of the state's race
and gender discrimination statutes.416 In Nealon v. City of Cleveland, an
applicant for a city law department position unsuccessfully sued for
discrimination based on a comment his initial interviewer made, that
" someone may have a problem with his having been a priest and because he
4 17
The court
once represented the Nation of Islam in a [criminal case.]"
ultimately determined that the state had proffered a legitimate reason for the
8
choice, namely that the applicant lacked relevant experience.4 1
As in the criminal cases, the Nation of Islam was a target for lawyers
attempting to sway jurors to their side. For example, in Reese v. Security
National Insurance Company, a workers' compensation case involving an
employee who hurt his back while lifting heavy steel rods went to a jury
trial.419 The employer's attorney not only referred to the employee's "black
Muslim activities" in his opening statement, but was also permitted by the
trial court to introduce testimony relating to those activities, which the
employer alleged was the basis for the employee's transfer to another
department. 42 0 The appellate court was not sympathetic to the employee's
claim of prejudice, given that the trial judge had instructed the jury not to
consider the employee's religious activities in their decision.42 1
References to Black Muslims or Islam in violent situations also

415 R.I. Dep't of Corr. v. R.I. Comm'n for Human Rights, No. C.A. 80-3086, 1984 WL 559221,
at * 1 (R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 1984) ("During the six week training course at the Training Academy,
complainant received an average of 81 on seven tests administered to Correctional Officer
Trainees from October 13, to October 27, 1978. Complainant received 220 out of 250 points in
firearms. He received a 90% rating on defenses from physical attacks.").
416 Id. at *2-*4. The court noted that the state, which may have had no Muslim correctional
officers according to the evidence, did not meet its burden under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1972) of providing a legitimate reason for its decision, although the plaintiff
had met his initial burden. Id. at *3-*5.
417 Nealon v. City of Cleveland, 746 N.E.2d 694, 696, 700-701 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
418 Id. at 701.
419 Reese v. Sec. Nat'l Ins. Co., 445 S.W.2d 811, 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
420 Id at 812-13.
421 Id at 813-14.
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cropped up in very odd ways in civil cases during this period.4 22 For
example, in an unemployment misconduct case, the president of a fruit
company quite unexpectedly saw one of his trucks parked on the highway
while he was driving with his family, so he stopped to see why.4 23 The truck
driver, who had been urinating, jumped in the truck, started honking and
reversed as if to ram the car, but then pulled out and left quickly.4 24 The
truck driver's explanation for his actions was that his friends, whom he
claimed had stopped to see if he was okay shortly before the company
president showed up, "were Muslims who hated white people and that he
jumped into the cab and drove away to protect [the company president] from
4 25
getting 'jumped on."'

In another unusual case of violence involving Black Muslims, Kelly v.
New York City TransitAuthority, a New York workers' compensation board
denied death benefits to a family of a Black Muslim man who had been
killed by his former co-worker, also a Black Muslim, based on the killer's
testimony that once he left the religion, the victim and other Black Muslims
had been harassing and blackmailing him to get him to rejoin.42 6
However, some of the unique cases discussing Muslims or Islam
during this period involved conflicts among members of the Nation of
Islam, or between their leaders and non-Muslims. For example, Minister
Louis Farrakhan filed a $4 billion libel lawsuit against the New York Post
for publishing Dr. Betty Shabazz's claims that Farrakhan was involved in

422 See, e.g., id.

423 Thompson v. Everett, E 82-345, 1983 WL 756, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App. July 6, 1983).
424 Id
425

id
426 Kelly v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 333 N.Y.S.2d 764,765-66 (App. Div. 1972). The killer
died in
a hospital for the criminally insane, but the basis for the worker's compensation decision was that
this testimony about the reason for the killing was hearsay and had insufficient corroboration. See
also Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Abdullah, 156 Cal. Rptr. 254, 257-58, 260 (Ct. App.
1979) (A man tried to test-drive a used car a second time after he had damaged it. The driver
persisted in asking for another test drive, claiming that the owner was refusing because he was a
Black Muslim and thus was engaging in racial discrimination. After some further words with the
employee and owner of the car lot, the dealer allowed the man to drive the car, resulting in a fatal
accident. The insurance company refused to pay, suggesting that the dealer had negligently
entrusted the car to the driver, knowing he had been arrested on traffic warrants); George v. Fabri,
548 S.E.2d 868, 870 (S.C. 2001) (detailing a city council candidate who sued another candidate
for defamation based on her claim that a racist, whose remarks included "Screw the Buddhists and
kill the Muslims," had endorsed the plaintiff candidate).
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the assassination of Malcolm X.4 27 Additionally, among other litigation, the
Attorney General of Illinois sued the Nation of Islam to recover donations
given to the Nation that were funneled into a corporation controlled by the
428
leader Elijah Muhammad, who then used the funds for personal needs.
As in the criminal cases, there were also civil disputes about which
faction of a Muslim sect held the right to its property. For example, in
People ex rel. Muhammad vs. Muhammad Rahman, the court held that
"neutral principles of law" based on corporate bylaws could be used to
decide whether a director of a mosque could be removed from office
without determining whether any of the disputing parties was a "good
Muslim."4

29

In these cases, the occasional gratuitous, sometimes apparently
humorous, references to Muslims mimic, in a somewhat more sophisticated
43 0
For
way, similar references made by courts in the pre-1960 period.
example, Piatti v. Jewish Community Centers of Greater Boston was a
religious discrimination case brought by a non-Jewish plaintiff against a

427 Farrakhan v. N.Y.P. Holdings, Inc., 640 N.Y.S.2d 80, 80-81 (App. Div. 1996) The reported
case related to the request of Farrakhan to be deposed in Chicago instead of New York for reasons
of his safety, which defendant's counsel, who was Jewish, objected to because it might be
dangerous or at least intimidating to depose Farrakhan at his headquarters. The court rejected
Farrakhan's request, noting that Farrakhan had recently traveled to New York City and other
places, and he would not be exposed publicly in the city. Id. at 81-82.
428 People ex rel. Burris v. Progressive Land Developers, Inc., 602 N.E.2d 820, 821-23 (Ill. 1992).
There are additional lawsuits involving the financial dealings of Elijah Muhammad both during
and after his life. See, e.g., Midway Tech. Inst. v. Muhammad, 291 N.E.2d 8 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972)
(breach of purchase contact); People ex rel. Hartigan v. Progressive Land Developers, Inc., 576
N.E.2d 214 (111. App. Ct. 1991) (one of several suits to prevent charitable contributions from being
funneled to Muhammad's private businesses); Farrahkan v. First Pac. Bank (In re Estate of
Muhammad), 463 N.E.2d 732 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); and In re Estate of Muhammad, 520 N.E.2d
795 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (both suits to determine whether Muhammad's heirs or the public should
be the beneficiaries of Muhammad's holdings that were accumulated by charitable gifts).
429 See People ex rel. Muhammad v. Muhammad-Rahmah, 682 N.E.2d 336, 339-40 (Ill. App. Ct.
1997) The provision in question read, "If the President and any member of the Board breaks any
of the rules that have been thus far been [sic] mentioned; and if [the] President and the members
of the Board is [sic] found to be in violation of the rules of the Muhammad Islamic Foundation
which are based upon the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad (SAW) or if he is
found trying to lead the Foundation and Corporation on an [sic] non-Islamic path-then any
member of the Board or Corporation shall be allowed to call for the termination of his position as
President or as a member of the Board." See also El Bey v. Moorish Sci. Temple of Am., 765
A.2d 132, 141 (Md. 2001). The court denied a permanent injunction to the Moorish Science
Temple against a Muslim who was representing himself as a director of the corporation and, the
temple claimed, soliciting money in its name. Id. The court held that there was no irreparable
injury from the mere representation because the temple had to explain under Islamic law why he
was not authorized as part of the temple. Id. The case includes a good, short history of the Moorish
Science Temple. Id. at 133.
430 See, e.g., Failinger, supra note 5, at 15-16 (discussing the use of Islam as an exaggerated
analogy or to illustrate a clear non sequitur).
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Jewish youth center for hiring only Jewish counselors.4 31 Although the facts
of this case made no mention of Muslims, the court chose to cite as an
analogy a case in which a non-Muslim pilot sued a private company that
required helicopter pilots guarding pilgrims as they marched toward Mecca
to convert to Islam.43 2 According to the judge, perhaps attempting to be
ironic, this was a classic case of a bona fide occupational qualification
("BFOQ") for these pilots, since non-Muslim pilots flying into Mecca were
subject to beheading.43 3 Similarly, the court in James v. Hubbardattempted
to make light of a dispute about whether a trial judge's statement that he
was going to grant a divorce between non-Muslims was effective, noting
that the talaq requires the husband to say, "I divorce thee" three times, and
commenting, "we do not require such clarity by the trial court."434
Finally, there are a few civil cases in this period in which courts
engaged in a more extended discussion comparing Islamic law (or national
law that incorporates Islamic law) and American law. In Blackstone v.
Aramco Services Company, an employee was fired for allegedly giving
kickbacks and approving improper invoices for subcontractors on water
well maintenance projects in Saudi Arabia.435 In this choice of laws case,
determining that U.S. law would apply because of public policy concerns,
the court noted a number of ways in which Saudi law, based on Islamic law,
differed from U.S. tort law. 436 For example, the court noted that the Shari'a
permits damages for actual physical injury through physical contact by the
tortfeasor, which provides preset values for each part of the body injured.4 37
Under Saudi law, a tort action may result in both damages and criminal
punishment, while non-physical injuries, not subject to tort recovery, may

431 Piatti v. Jewish Cmty. Ctrs. of Greater Bos., No. 91-5198-F, 1993 WL 562347, at *1 (Mass.
Super.
Ct. Dec. 14, 1993).
4 32
Id. at *1 n.15.
433 id

434 James v. Hubbard, 21 S.W.3d 558, 559 n.l (Tex. App. 2000); see also Home Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Superior Court, 126 Cal. Rptr. 511, 514 (Ct. App. 1976) (in a case against a home loan
association unrelated to Muslims or Islam, the court opined, "As was said with respect to the need
for glossaries on the text of the Koran: if the opinion of the superior court agrees with that of the
Supreme Court, it is superfluous; if it is disagrees, it is mischievous; in neither event is it useful.");
cf Rivera Ilarraza v. Municipality of Fajardo, 3 P.R. Offic. Trans. 461, 465-68 (P.R. 1975)
(discussing at length the Catholic re-conquest of Muslim lands to explain the Puerto Rican
requirement that a property may not be sold at auction if the seller was not physically possessing
the property).
435 Blackstone v. Aramaco Servs. Co., No. 01-89-00203-CV, 1991 WL 63630, at *1 (Tex. App.
Apr. 25, 1991).
436 Id. at *1-*2.
437 id
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be punished by ta'zir: "incarceration or lashing by the State."4 3 8
Similarly, in Rhodes v. ITT Sheraton Corporation, the court
determined that it would accept jurisdiction for a personal injury case
regarding a diving injury that occurred in Saudi Arabia, after evaluating
Saudi law based on Islamic law.439 The court heard testimony of Islamic
expert and Harvard professor Frank Vogel before holding that jurisdiction
in Saudi Arabia would be problematic for a number of reasons." 0 First, the
plaintiff would be unable to testify, as parties cannot testify in favor of
themselves in Saudi Arabia."' Second, the Saudi courts give more weight
to oral testimony, which would be problematical for the plaintiff because of
her severe injuries." 2 Finally, the plaintiff would be required to prove her
case with two male witnesses or one male and two female witnesses." The
lack of any procedural rules and limited cross-examination would further
disadvantage the plaintiff, as would the lack of binding precedent or case
law.'" But perhaps most importantly, the court held that "the existence of
biases against women and non-Muslims in Saudi Arabia would impose
additional disadvantages on plaintiff.""
Since there are so few of these civil cases involving specific references
to Islam or Muslims' religious practices, it is more difficult to generalize
what we might learn about courts' assumptions during this period from
1960 to September 11, 2001. One does see the occasional reference to Black
Muslims that mimics the concerns in the criminal cases. Moreover, cases
such as Bilal demonstrate that it is often difficult for American courts to
*1, *3. See also Bridas Corp. v. Unocal Corp., 16 S.W.3d 893, 902-904 (Tex. App. 2000)
(discussing extensively Russian and Islamic-based Afghani law in a tortious interference suit by
one oil and gas developer against another).
439 Rhodes v. ITY Sheraton Corp., No. CIV.A. 97-4530-B, 1999 WL 26874, at *3-*4 (Mass.
438 Id. at

Super. Ct. Jan. 15, 1999).
440 Id. at *2.
41

Id.

443 id
4

Id at *3.

Id. Some civil cases involving Muslims cannot be easily characterized: see Khalifa v. Muslim
Students' Ass'n of U.S. and Can., Inc., 641 P.2d 242, 242-43 (Az. Ct. App. 1981), in which a
reviewer of the plaintiffs translation of the Qur'an called him a "charlatan" and "mentally
imbalanced" because of some of his translations, and opined that he did not deserve to be awarded
a Ph.D. based on the poor translation. The court upheld a motion for summary judgment for the
defendants based on no finding of "actual malice" required by the Arizona statute. Id. at 243. See
also Abukhadra v. Anoka Cty, No. B-45943, 1982 WL 1108, at *2, *3, *6-*7 (Minn. T.C. Sept.
9, 1982) in which the court rejected the claims of devout Muslims, who were Saudi nationals, to
a religious exemption from taxation for a parcel they purchased for the Islamic Center of
Minnesota to hold worship services. While the court conceded that this property would be properly
tax-exempt if the entity owning it were a religious organization, the fact that the private owners
planned to use it for religious purposes did not make it tax-exempt. Id.
44
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separate assumptions about Muslims' religious beliefs from their national
affiliations and cultural expectations that differ from majority Caucasian
norms. Sometimes those differences result in courts' attempting to be
humorous at Muslims' expense. Although some cases of religious
harassment are quite blatant, in other cases, this difficulty in sorting which
of these issues is at play makes hard work for courts adjudicating religious
freedom claims as much as international tort claims.
V. CONCLUSION

While it is hard to dispositively characterize American state courts'
references to Muslims and Islam in the period 1960 to September 11, 2001
due to the small number of cases in any one jurisdiction, a number of themes
stand out. Perhaps most prominently, "Black Muslims" were portrayed as
dangerous, violent, and untrustworthy in the criminal cases; additionally, in
both criminal and civil cases, Muslims were portrayed as having beliefs
about women and family that are beyond what American courts could
accept as permissible. This portrayal tracks how Muslims were portrayed in
film during this time period. For example, Omer Mozaffar's study of
American movies suggests:
The 1960s and 1970s witnessed the appearance of two
related but distinct depictions of Muslims-Black Muslim
and Middle Eastern Muslims-and both were militant. In
addition to the normal problem of stereotyping, the first
problem is that these negative images became the default
for their perspective [sic] groups. The second problem is
that American domestic or foreign policy were made
exempt in feeding into the formation of these groups. All
along, Muslims get associated with violence." 6
It is hard to know whether portrayals of Muslims in newspapers, movies,
and other popular media outlets influenced these court depictions, or
whether notorious cases, such as the Hanafi Muslim Massacre and the
Louisiana Black Muslim riots, influenced the popular culture.
Similarly, while criminal courts were willing to overturn convictions
where repeated and blatant "Muslim-baiting" tactics are used by
prosecutors to inflame the jury, they often forgave isolated or less blatant
references to Muslims or Islam, even in murder cases where the
consequences of unconscious prejudice on juries can be extreme, and even
446 Omer M. Mozaffar, Islam in Western Cinema, Part2 - The Violent, Militant Muslim, ROGER

EBERT'S FAR FLUNG CORRESPONDENTS (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.rogerebert.com/far-flungcorrespondents/islam-in-western-cinema-part-2---the-violent-militant-muslim.
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deadly, for defendants. Moreover, while some courts seemed aware of the
implications that would follow Muslim litigants' own actions-such as
wearing dress or expecting to engage in Friday prayers-that might wrongly
prejudice juries, other courts seemed to put the burden on Muslims to hide
their differences if they did not want to be treated unfairly by juries. And,
in some cases, prosecutors, judges, and even defense counsel displayed their
own prejudices or ignorance about the Muslim identity of litigants before
them.
Second, these stereotypes of violence are much more prominent in the
criminal cases than in family law or civil cases, perhaps for obvious reasons.
In the family law cases, the courts seem much more willing to treat Islamic
law or secular national law based on Islamic law as worthy of equal respect
as a parallel system of government, although they tend not to rely on Islamic
law alone if it is not embedded in a nation's secular law, and they freely
reject it when it is in conflict with their state's public policy.
Third, as in the former period chronicled by this author from 18001960," there remains an undercurrent of suspicion about Islamic law's
treatment of women, especially in marriage and divorce. While, once again,
the courts cast aside extreme-and blatantly false-claims that Islamic law
permits men to beat their wives severely or allows incest, they did tend to
protect women whose rights to property or support might be diminished if
Islamic law rules were applied, at least as the courts understood them.
Although the courts tended to apply secular state rules in marriage and
divorce cases, on occasion they bent minor rules in order to effectuate
justice for women.
Finally, courts did not hesitate to mention that litigants were Muslim
in many cases where it would seem superfluous, and possibly prejudicial,
to their case. And, at least a few courts were willing to use Islamic law as a
jest, just as courts did in the earlier period.
A common problem for judges who do not fully understand a culture,
as with anyone, is whether it is more respectful to acknowledge minority
citizens' differences, and risk getting those differences completely wrong,
or to ignore those differences and thereby erase them. This study suggests
that courts should be very careful about the way in which they portray
Muslims and Islamic law, because it is too easy to fall back on negative
stereotyping present in culture already, in violation of the courts' obligation
to provide equal treatment under law. The consequences of cursory
inspection or superficial knowledge can be very severe, in both criminal and
civil cases. Only when courts are willing and able to make the time and
effort to understand Islamic law and Muslim culture in a deep way are they

44

See Failinger, supra note 5.
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likely to be able to engage Muslims and Islamic law in a way that conveys
respect for differences as well as commonalities.
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